Attacks using improvised explosive devices are among the deadliest. They require flexible responses that match terror groups’ changing tactics.
Insurgents are increasingly using improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Benin to hamper the mobility and responsiveness of the country’s defence and security forces. IEDs are also being used in neighbouring Togo.
Terror attacks have spiked in northern Benin since 2021, and while IED-related incidents have fallen this year, they are among the deadliest attacks in the country. Landmines are also reportedly sometimes used in Benin.
According to Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED), at least 45 incidents involving IEDs have been recorded in northern Benin since 2021. Under-reporting could mean this number is even higher. In the most recent attack on 7 November, a soldier was killed in Karimana commune in Benin’s Alibori Department.
The first incident in the country occurred on 10 December 2021, when an army vehicle struck an IED near the town of Porga in the Atacora Department, seriously injuring four soldiers. From 2022 onwards, IED attacks gradually spread to the Alibori Department.
In addition to this geographical expansion, the targets and methods of IED use in Benin have evolved. These devices – initially placed on roads used by defence and security forces and in parks – are now buried in roads and fields used by civilians. According to ACLED, between 2022 and September 2024, at least 14 civilians, including four children, were killed by IEDs.
Two other methods of concealing these devices were documented by ACLED. In May 2023, an IED placed under the body of a woman who had died the previous day exploded, killing two men. Two months later, the military defused an IED placed in a can. In January 2024, MTN cellphone installations were targeted in Loumbou-Loumbou.
In addition to obstructing security forces’ operations and their ability to protect civilians, the indiscriminate use of IEDs has multiple impacts, both human (death and mutilation) and material (destruction of vehicles and infrastructure). They also restrict mobility, create fear and psychosis, and cause trauma.
IED attacks significantly hamper communities’ access to income-generating activities (fields, grazing areas, markets, etc.) and basic social services. Their continued use could restrict humanitarian access to affected populations.
Sources responsible for developing and implementing measures to deal with violent extremism in Benin say the government’s response focuses on three main initiatives. The first aims to strengthen the defence and security forces’ operational capabilities through raising awareness and training mine clearance specialists. The training is supported by a Benin-based centre specialising in post-conflict demining and decontamination, and external partners (United States, France, Germany and Belgium).
The government has acquired and received equipment such as compact metal detectors, night vision devices, surveillance drones, armoured front vehicles and first aid kits. Emphasis has been placed on improving data collection and intelligence gathering in the field.
The second initiative involved running public education campaigns on the risks of explosive devices, and the role civilians in affected communities could play in early warning. The campaigns were coordinated by the interior and public security ministry, as part of civil-military activities, and by non-governmental and civil society organisations.
Third, in April 2024, the National Commission to Combat the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons, in collaboration with the Small Arms Survey, organised a self-assessment workshop on the national framework, practices and procedures for preventing and combatting IEDs in Benin.
The aim was to enable the government to examine and draft a new roadmap for a comprehensive national strategy to combat IEDs. This is one of the key recommendations of the United Nations General Assembly draft resolution of October 2024 on countering the IED threat.
These efforts could explain both the drop in the number of incidents documented in Benin from 2023-2024 and the rise in arrests of people suspected of planting IEDs, as reported by ACLED. They could also explain the increase in devices detected and defused during 2024, sometimes after alerts from communities, whose role in fighting the threat is vital. Between December 2021 and September 2023, the army reportedly found and neutralised around 50 IEDs.
The state’s actions need to be sustained. Above all, they must be based on real-time analysis of the constantly changing threat to better understand it and adapt tactical solutions. This requires continuous effort to enhance data collection and investigation capacity. The government should also increase context-specific awareness raising and training for civilians and those operating in affected areas.
It is essential to cut off insurgents’ supplies of materials used in manufacturing IEDs. The state must choke the illicit flow of arms and ammunition into Benin, along with dual-use components or products like commercial explosives, chemical substances and fertilisers used to make IEDs. It must also continue reinforcing the security of arms and ammunition stores in barracks and isolated posts to prevent them being used by militants.
These efforts must be part of a cross-border approach with Benin’s neighbouring countries, particularly Burkina Faso. The two countries are in a dispute over the Kourou-Koualou area, where several IED attacks have been documented.
Information and intelligence must be shared between national stakeholders and affected countries. Implementing recommendations from October’s annual Economic Community of West African States National Commissions on Small Arms coordination meeting could enhance regional collaboration.
Finally, the government could set up a programme to care for civilian victims of terror attacks, including those involving IEDs. This should include medical and psychological support, rehabilitation and socio-economic reintegration. This is in addition to Benin’s law No. 2022-28, which provides for the care of defence and security forces injured or killed on duty, and their dependents.
Such efforts are necessary to encourage civilians to contribute to state efforts through intelligence sharing and collaboration with security forces. This is essential, considering that attacks against civilians are increasing.
Jeannine Ella Abatan, Senior Researcher, ISS Regional Office for West Africa and the Sahel
Hassane Koné, Senior Researcher, ISS Regional Office for West Africa and the Sahel
