Security sector reforms that began well before the country’s two coups still suffer from a lack of effective civil society participation.
Since its 2020 and 2021 military coups, Mali has been undergoing a prolonged political transition. Insecurity remains high, with jihadist attacks and clashes between armed groups. Despite Russian paramilitary support, Mali’s army is struggling to cope with the situation.
This raises questions about Mali’s security sector reform (SSR) project that started in 2013. The reform was initiated in the wake of a multidimensional crisis arising from the Tuareg rebellion calling for the independence of northern Mali. The SSR process aimed to strengthen the Malian state’s defence and security capabilities.
After the Algiers peace agreement ended the rebel insurgency in 2015, the reform was amended to accommodate the deal’s provisions. The agreement called for a reorganisation of the armed and security forces by establishing institutions capable of meeting national security needs and contributing to regional stability.
Ten years later, SSR implementation has stalled due to lack of political prioritisation, corruption, insufficient stakeholder involvement – including civil society, limited resources, and former rebels refusing to disarm and be stationed. This prevented Mali’s armed forces from strengthening to counter terrorist threats and restore security.
Despite these obstacles, the reform continues, with activities such as finalising the national security policy, regulating the security sector, and enhancing defence forces’ infrastructure and equipment, ethics, deontology and accountability. Other activities include strengthening the operational capacities of the justice services and integrating gender considerations into all security sector activities.
However, the priority of the transitional authorities remains urgent expenditure on equipment and military services to combat jihadist groups. In January 2024, they terminated the Algiers agreement, citing its inapplicability, and, by so doing, effectively excluded the separatists from the SSR process.
A mid-term evaluation of the reforms, published in February 2024 by the Citizens’ Alliance for Security Sector Reform, highlights the importance of greater collaboration among all actors, better communication, and particular attention to justice systems.
Originally designed to be inclusive and participatory, SSR in Mali aimed to build security and justice institutions that would be effective, accountable and respectful of human rights and the rule of law. It sought to improve security sector governance by establishing democratic oversight exercised by various actors, including civil society.
SSR implementation is managed by a steering committee supported by an executive body, a commissioner to the SSR, and regional and local security consultative committees. The institutional framework provides for the active involvement of civil society organisations (CSOs) in supervision and monitoring. This means civil society representatives should be included in the commissioner and consultative committees of the regions and communes.
The role of CSOs in the democratic control of the security sector is essential, as they can help prevent an environment conducive to corruption, embezzlement, injustice and impunity.
Yet CSOs were initially excluded from the SSR commissioner. Only when security consultative committees were created in 2019 was civil society included. From 2020, workshops and forums funded by the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, the African Union Mission for Mali and the Sahel, and the European Union were organised to raise awareness within civil society about their role in SSR.
Within the regional and local consultative committees, CSOs ensure monitoring of the security situation and provide recommendations to the executive and local actors. However, they lament that regional authorities rarely consider their contributions.
Several factors prevent Malian CSOs from establishing themselves as key players in this process. First – like in many countries undergoing SSR – the political and security authorities are reluctant to involve CSOs in security issues in a crisis-stricken country, where a tradition of secrecy surrounds defence matters, and the fight against insecurity is a top priority.
Second, most CSOs in Mali lack the capacity to collaborate or mobilise on activities related to the control of the security sector. Third, they suffer from a lack of autonomy due to their dependence on external technical and financial partners or state authorities who may influence them.
Fourth, the authorities’ 2022 decision to suspend the activities of those CSOs supported by France and the adoption of a new regulation that strengthens government control over CSOs stifled numerous organisations. This decision also increased the fragmentation of civil society.
The military authorities have selected only a few CSOs they are prepared to work with. Consultations relating to SSR have been limited to state-backed organisations, such as the National Civil Society Council, the National Youth Council before its dissolution, and the Coordination of Malian Women’s Associations.
The exclusion of all other CSOs has been criticised by organisations and civil society stakeholders who aspire to be actively involved in the ongoing SSR process and discussions on national security.
To address this challenge, authorities must partner with independent, credible and competent CSOs by building their capacity and enabling them to play a meaningful role in the process. This will require creating a forum for discussions and ensuring civil society representation at all levels of the institutional architecture set up for SSR.
The transition leaders have included SSR among major reforms for building a new Mali. By dedicating the necessary attention and proper resources to ensure reform success, they will be able to claim a decisive contribution to securing and stabilising the country.
Hassane Koné, Senior Researcher, ISS Regional Office for West Africa and the Sahel
