As conflicts rage across the continent, does the AU’s decision to relegate its mediation role in favour of weak and ineffective Regional Economic Communities require rethinking?
1. Contextualising subsidiarity in Africa’s peace and security framework
The decision by African leaders to replace the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) with the African Union (AU) in 2002 signified a collective aspiration to reinvigorate the continental body by providing it with effective tools to deal with the challenges facing Africa in the 21st century, namely the lack of unity, prosperity and sustainable peace. The move from the OAU to the AU marked a shift in focus from decolonization and the fight against the vestiges of racialism on the continent, to a desire to deepen prosperity and unity, as well as consolidate peace within, between and among African states. This move was made at a time when Africa was also facing a heightening human security polycrisis, which, from every indication, had overwhelmed the OAU’s toolbox.
To substantiate, the peace and security objectives of the new body, the African Union adopted the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council in 2002 (the 2002 Protocol). The 2002 Protocol established the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) as the primary decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflict on the continent, with the support of the Commission, the Panel of the Wise, the African Stand-by Force, the Continental Early Warning System and a Special Fund.
While determining the primacy of the AU in dealing with peace and security issues in Africa, the 2002 Protocol also identified entry points and modalities for engagement in its Article 9 (1&2), stating that the AUPSC shall undertake initiatives and action it deems appropriate and “use its discretion to effect entry, whether through the collective intervention of the Council itself or through its Chairperson and/or the Chairperson of the Commission, the Panel of the Wise, and/or in collaboration with the Regional Mechanisms.” It is this collaboration with Regional Mechanisms that would introduce the principle of subsidiarity to Africa’s conflict prevention posture, as it defined the structural balance of power between the African Union and Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs).
This relationship between the AU and RECs was articulated in the 2008 Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Area of Peace and Security between the AU, RECs and the Coordinating Mechanisms of the Regional Standby Brigades of Eastern and Northern Africa (2008 MOU). While reiterating recognition of the primary responsibility of the AU in maintaining peace and security in Africa (Article IV (ii)), the MoU also called for “adherence to the principles of subsidiarity, and comparative advantage in order to optimize the partnership between the Union, the RECs and the Coordinating Mechanisms…” (Article IV (iv)).
Subsidiarity – originally a European Union governance concept – thus became a central concept that has defined and shaped Africa’s inter-institutional balance of power on peacebuilding issues. This principle, as originally conceptualised in the European Union context, states that a central authority should have a subsidiary role and only be charged with those tasks that cannot be performed effectively at a more immediate or local level. Subsidiarity is based on the understanding that chances of securing sustainable peace are higher if conflict resolution is led by actors who are in geopolitical, geostrategic and socio-cultural proximity to a crisis, supporting the general idea that mediation should, in the first instance, be directly supported and led by RECs, rather than the continental body, the AU.
Despite significant gaps and ambiguities in the conceptualization and implementation of subsidiarity as a strategic peace-building approach, it has continued to be used, on the one hand, by RECs to assert their primacy in the resolution of conflicts in different parts of the continent, and on the other hand, by the African Union to shed responsibility over perennial conflict situations. In addition to conceptual issues around AU-RECs hierarchy on primacy and the lack of clarity on the threshold for escalating conflict management to the higher level, practical cases have shown that some RECs hog peace processes and engage in turf wars with the AU, despite sustained poor performance.
2. Challenges in the implementation of subsidiarity
There has been no more patent exhibition of the challenges faced in the implementation of the principle of subsidiarity in Africa’s crisis diplomacy than has been demonstrated in efforts to address the endemic and cyclical crisis in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Owing to its overlapping sub-regional memberships of the ICGLR, the EAC, SADC and ECCAS, the DRC’s crises have been handled by one or more of these RECs at some point in time, with the latest iterations undertaken under the auspices of the EAC and SADC.
The continued “conflict resolution musical chairs” displayed by these different RECs over the crisis in eastern Congo-K – while the African Union has generally played a less prominent role – reveals an overall tendency towards inefficiency, lack of effective coordination among peacebuilding actors, lack of trust in processes and an affinity towards forum shopping.
Nothing more aptly demonstrated the latter tendencies than the unilateral decision by the Tshisekedi administration to replace the East African Community Regional Force that was deployed to the volatile East of the country with the Southern African Development Community Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (SAMIDRC), amidst the struggling regionally-led Nairobi and Luanda processes.
A most shocking depiction of the confusion associated with the implementation of subsidiarity was the exclusion of the AU Chairperson, Moussa Faki Mahamat, from a closed-door session of the joint EAC/SADC extraordinary summit on the DRC which took place in Dar es Salaam on 8 February. That the Chairperson of the continental body was ordered out of a meeting of RECs intended to resolve a major crisis on the continent epitomised an acute crisis of conflict resolution facing the continent.
Besides eastern Congo, several crises on the African continent, including those in the Sahel, Sudan, Cameroon, and in the Horn of Africa – within Ethiopia and which also involved Eritrea; and between Ethiopia and Somalia over the Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU – have shown the complexity and limitations in the practical implementation of the principle of subsidiarity.
ECOWAS’s challenges dealing with countries of the AES (Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso) have not only amplified the complexity of subsidiarity but also exposed its stark limitations. Given the transnational and trans-regional nature of the initial threats of an ECOWAS military intervention in Niger to restore constitutional order, for instance, countries within ECCAS were concerned about the consequences of such an intervention given the possibility of a humanitarian crisis spilling beyond the ECOWAS region.
Some analysts in countries like Cameroon and Chad, which are not ECOWAS members, stress that ECOWAS should not be allowed the prerogative to take the lead on an issue with potential consequences beyond that sub-region. On the crisis in Sudan, the lack of trust in IGAD as a neutral broker by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) undermined IGAD-led mediation efforts. In addition to this, extra-regional and extra-continental influences on the warring parties, including by Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, for instance, limit localised regional mechanisms, eviscerating the substance of subsidiarity.
In the same vein, IGAD’s mediation faced challenges addressing the crisis between Ethiopia and Somalia over the MoU signed between Ethiopia and Somaliland on 1 January 2024. It took Turkey, a country that is outside the continent – the Horn of Africa region is, arguably, its biggest sphere of influence outside Asia – to facilitate a peaceful resolution through the Ankara agreement. Turkey, a non-African state, succeeded where others closer to the crisis, including immediate neighbours and the African Union, failed. These scenarios indicate that the practice of subsidiarity in Africa’s peace and security architecture is facing increasing complexity, amidst transnationalism, trans-regionalism, emerging multipolarity in global politics, and ongoing continental and extra-continental geopolitical realignments.
3. Rethinking the Conflict Resolution Division of Labour in Africa
The picture above shows that the principle of subsidiarity, as conceptualised and practiced in Africa’s peace-building landscape, remains challenging. While neighbouring countries and RECs are pivotal stakeholders in conflict resolution, their automatic arrogation of the lead role in crisis diplomacy, without practical parameters for international coordination, cooperation and collaboration, appears problematic for sustainable resolution. This is particularly so given the complexities of Africa’s emergencies, often characterized by transnational primordial identities, weak RECs, the pervasive lack of trust among regional leaders, the transnational nature of peace and security threats, as well as extra-regional influences and consequences.
As was the case at the turn of the last century, several hot conflicts are raging across the continent at the quarter-century mark. The African Union must implement longstanding institutional reforms and reassert its preeminence, as per Article 16 of the 2002 Protocol, and regain the lead in conflict management, working in close collaboration with the United Nations, RECs and civil society organisations, as well as with emerging and major powers. A lack of implementation of these reforms, including of the AUPSC – recently merged with the Political Affairs Commission under the Kagame Reforms to become the Political Affairs, Peace & Security Commission (PAPSC) – would lead to the continued dismal performance in the face of Africa’s complex emergencies and profound developmental challenges.
For the African Union to succeed in its “Silencing the Guns” mission, a critical aspect of Agenda 2063, it must establish strategic balance between both regional and continental agency. The AU must relaunch a clear strategic framework for conflict resolution, detailing its role as first respondent and clearly defining its multi-level diplomatic relationship with RECs. A workable framework should fully integrate key modalities such as leverage, linkage, trust, competencies and comparative advantage, amidst Africa’s increasingly complex, transnational and transregional human security challenges. This is particularly urgent for the incoming leadership of the African Union Commission, especially at a time when the West appears increasingly inward-looking and disinterested in Africa’s conflicts.
Koffi Sawyer is a researcher and consultant with over 15 years of working with institutions include the UN, the Commonwealth, and Chatham House. He has worked with several countries to provide electoral assistance and supported dozens of election observation missions.
