The dual peacebuilding processes are equally important – and can run simultaneously through coordination and sequencing.
As Ethiopia navigates its complex and fragile political transition, indications are that the transitional justice process is experiencing delays. A public consultation on draft transitional justice laws, initially scheduled for earlier this year, has not occurred.
Unofficial but widely circulated claims in the public domain suggest that transitional justice is informally on hold until the National Dialogue Commission concludes its mandate.
From the outset, tension has surrounded the coexistence of these two processes, with stakeholders expressing concern that one may steal the spotlight or undermine the urgency and relevance of the other.
Transitional justice actors feared the national dialogue would monopolise institutional and political attention. Proponents of national dialogue viewed transitional justice, with its rapid process and victim-centred agenda, as potentially polarising and ill-timed. They contended that transitional justice should be delayed – approached instead as a downstream outcome of the dialogue process.
However, the relationship between the two processes hasn’t been adequately clarified or publicly debated. Furthermore, anonymous sources say government’s failure to establish the Transitional Justice Institutional Coordination Mechanism may have contributed to tensions and the lack of a system to manage institutional and process politics.
While transitional justice focuses on acknowledging harm, providing redress for victims and reforming institutions, national dialogue aims to forge inclusive agreements on fundamental national issues like governance, identity and peaceful coexistence.
Globally, various peacebuilding models involving both processes exist in post-conflict settings. Transitional justice can result from dialogue, occur before it, or alongside it. In Ethiopia, transitional justice is an independent process supported by legal and political mandates. It is not just an aspirational ideal – but an established policy commitment.
The impetus for pursuing transitional justice didn’t arise from the national dialogue; it was motivated by public demands, empirical evidence, international legal obligations and government’s political promises. These were detailed in the Green Paper prepared by the Transitional Justice Working Group of Experts, constituted by the Justice Ministry following the 2022 Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) between the Federal Government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front.
Momentum for addressing past abuses through transitional justice emerged even before the Tigray conflict. However, these pre-war efforts were fragmented and poorly coordinated.
In response to the violations committed during the war, a joint investigation of the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission and Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights recommended transitional justice as essential in 2021. The CoHA requires government to establish a comprehensive, national and victim-centred mechanism that aligns with international human rights standards and the African Union Transitional Justice Policy.
In line with the policy adopted by the Council of Ministers in 2024, draft laws have been prepared establishing the Special Bench, Special Prosecution Office, Truth and Social Cohesion Commission, and Vetting Commission.
Components of truth-seeking and social cohesion in transitional justice may intersect with the national dialogue’s efforts to identify the root causes of violence and instability. Both may examine structural aspects of violence, reconstruct narratives and clarify history.
Sources suggest that this overlap contributes to tension between national dialogue and transitional justice. Without a framework to coordinate these overlapping mandates, there is a risk of duplication, confusion and public participation fatigue.
The issue calls for a participatory and transparent discussion to clarify how truth-telling, historical inquiry and reconciliation under both processes can be synchronised. What is needed is strategic alignment – not establishing a superficial institutional hierarchy.
One way to resolve the confusion is to temporarily pause both processes. This could allow for potential intersections to be examined and addressed through coordination or mandate revisions. That would help ensure complementarity and enable transitional justice and national dialogue to progress concurrently, reinforcing rather than undermining one another.
A temporary pause could also be justified by the current conflict situation. For instance, if a peace process is initiated to end hostilities in Amhara or Oromia, a temporary deferral of justice initiatives may be pragmatic.
The same holds for national dialogue. Insecurity, displacement and distrust have obstructed public engagement in certain areas, resulting in major opposition political parties withdrawing. Given that the National Dialogue Commission is struggling to finalise the first of its five major activities, it is unlikely to conclude its work within the remainder of the recently extended deadline of February 2026.
Delaying transitional justice in favour of national dialogue incorrectly suggests that transitional justice is secondary to national dialogue and that the pursuit of justice must wait for political consensus. This is wrong for at least four reasons.
First, postponing transitional justice risks reinforcing perceptions – both domestically and internationally – that the government was never fully committed to the initiative, and is retreating as the process gains momentum. That could undermine public trust and international credibility, making it difficult to rebuild momentum or mobilise the political, institutional and financial resources necessary to pursue the process credibly.
Second, the need for transitional justice is expressed in the CoHA, public consultations and national surveys, which predate and stand independently from future recommendations of the national dialogue process. Delays would amount to holding justice hostage to processes that are neither substitutes for nor prerequisites to redress – potentially deepening victims’ perception of prolonged neglect and impunity.
Third, postponing transitional justice is premature. The anticipated overlap with the national dialogue and the proposed truth-seeking and social cohesion commission has not materialised as the transitional justice process is still in its preparatory phase.
Fourth, Ethiopia doesn’t face an either/or dilemma. The transitional justice process does not overburden institutional capacity or divert public attention. It could continue while the two processes are aligned.
Even if, following an assessment of overlaps and tensions, a decision is taken to delay implementation of certain transitional justice components, such a decision must be selective rather than blanket. A careful sequencing strategy should pinpoint which pillars might be temporarily paused or adjusted to enhance complementarity between the two processes.
Equally essential is that any such decision be communicated through an official and transparent process to safeguard both initiatives from damaging speculation and erosion of public trust.
Ultimately, any approach to resolving tensions must preserve the integrity and objectives of both processes. Transitional justice does not obstruct national dialogue, and national dialogue should not obstruct justice.
Tadesse Simie Metekia, Senior Researcher, Special Projects, ISS Addis Ababa
