What are the terms of the deal the U.S. is trying to negotiate with the DRC and Rwanda?
The Trump administration has made its interest in strengthening critical mineral supply chains clear, and that imperative appears to be central to its emerging approach to Africa. So it comes as no surprise that the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) would be an early focus, given the country’s vast mineral wealth. But as U.S. officials pursue their transactional approach to foreign policy, numerous questions are emerging about just what kind of deals are on the table.
The first complication–or opportunity, depending on one’s perspective–is the security situation. Against a backdrop of persistent insecurity in eastern Congo, the M23, a Rwanda-backed rebel force, has been on the offensive, seizing large swathes of territory and the important cities of Goma and Bukavu. Kinshasa, militarily unable to defeat the Rwanda-backed rebels and diplomatically unable to muster sufficient regional support, has been eager to get the United States involved in its pursuit of regime survival, proposing a security-for-minerals deal.
The conflict is vicious and has fueled a devasting humanitarian crisis. So it was good news when the Foreign Ministers from Rwanda and Congo joined U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio in Washington D.C. on April 25 to sign a declaration of principles aimed at establishing a framework for a subsequent peace plan. Secretary Rubio stated plainly that the deal will help “protect our strategic interest in critical minerals to grow our tech sector.”
The mission to bring peace to eastern Congo, however, is far from accomplished. The recent past is littered with broken ceasefires and fruitless mediation efforts. Rwanda’s aggression and the DRC’s own corruption and broken governance have been co-conspirators in fueling the current crisis. Even a deal that satisfies the leadership of those countries but lacks transparency and viable means for translating economic gains into social goods for the population may be regarded with skepticism by the Congolese people; prominent civil society leaders have warned against selling off the country’s resources for the benefit of foreign powers, a dynamic with a long and tragic history in the country.
But the government of the DRC is not the only actor seeking to capitalize on Washington’s newfound enthusiasm for dealmaking. Rwanda’s leadership has deftly sought to make itself an indispensable actor in the region and beyond by offering itself as a solution to others’ vexing problems. Kigali has sent soldiers to help contain insurgencies in the Central African Republic and Mozambique in addition to its contributions to United Nations peacekeeping missions. Surely the Rwandans, under international pressure for supporting violent rebel forces in eastern Congo, have considered how they might make themselves useful to the Trump administration.
News that the country has begun accepting deportees from the United States–who have no connection at all to Rwanda–might ring a bell. Former British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak had championed a similar scheme to send refugees arriving in the United Kingdom on to Rwanda, meeting resistance from British courts and human rights defenders. Ultimately, Sunak lost his job and his successor scrapped the plan, but not before the UK paid some 290 million pounds to Rwanda. Perhaps the British example inspired the secrecy surrounding the Trump administration’s new initiative. But it’s worth asking just what Rwanda wants, beyond financial support, in exchange for accepting deportees from the U.S., and how that might affect the administration’s sudden enthusiasm for getting involved in negotiations between Kinshasa and Kigali.
Rwanda does have its own mineral resources. But it’s also the case that some critical minerals exported from Rwanda originated in the eastern DRC, where armed groups have established control over important mining areas and smuggling networks. How much of this might be formalized in the dealmaking to come? What about Uganda’s extractive networks? The prospect of the United States of America blessing decisions about who will benefit financially from Congolese resources while propping up the shaky government in Kinshasa risks being both unsavory and unstable.
