The Red Sea region is a geopolitical hotspot. It holds strategic maritime importance as a global trade transit route and plays a crucial role in the broader region’s security and economic stability.
Various actors are vying for influence in this important region. They include Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, China, the US and Italy, which have set up military bases. Insecurity in the Red Sea region has a ripple effect on the cost of global trade. These military bases are intended to protect oil and merchant shipping.
With the interests at play here, the Red Sea basin has become an arena for complex global relations. This was especially evident following an early 2024 agreement between landlocked Ethiopia and the breakaway state of Somaliland to grant Addis Ababa access to the Red Sea. The agreement, which Somalia saw as an affront, has had huge implications that continue to play out. It sparked agreements that led to new alliances – but also tested old ones.
As local and foreign interests collide, new dynamics are shaping the region’s politics. The Conversation Africa has, over the years, worked with a range of academics to help readers understand the effects of these shifting alliances. Here are some of their insights.
Ethiopia-Somaliland agreement
On 1 January 2024, Ethiopian prime minister Abiy Ahmed and Somaliland president Muse Bihi Abdi announced a plan to give landlocked Ethiopia access to the Somaliland coastline for 50 years. In exchange, Ethiopia would consider supporting Somaliland’s quest for international recognition as a sovereign state. Somalia, which lays claim to Somaliland, declared the agreement an act of aggression. The deal – and the subsequent international opposition it drew – illustrate the complex web of alliances and rivalries shaping the region’s politics, as Aleksi Ylönen explains.
The Houthi threat
Early January also highlighted the global impact of insecurity in the Red Sea region. Houthi militia, who are Yemen-based rebels, became one of the Red Sea basin’s most pressing security threats. The rebels claimed to be targeting Israeli-linked vessels to protest against Israel’s war against Hamas in Gaza. However, Saudi ships were the biggest casualty of their attacks. These attacks underscored the persistent insecurity in one of the world’s most strategic waterways. Addressing this, security analyst Burak Şakir Şeker suggests, requires a coordinated international response.
Turkey in Somali waters
In response to the Houthi threat and other security threats in the region, Turkey has deepened its involvement in Somalia. Ankara announced a new defence agreement with Mogadishu in February 2024. Under the terms of the deal, Turkey would provide military aid and training to help Somalia protect its waters from piracy and illegal fishing. But, as international relations professor Federico Donelli explains, the agreement is just part of Turkey’s long-term strategic investment in the region. The maritime defence engagement supports Ankara’s broader foreign policy strategy to gain greater autonomy in global politics.
Balancing act
Turkey’s growing engagement in Somalia has strained its historical ties with Ethiopia. Ethiopia, already navigating the fallout from its agreement with Somaliland, views the maritime developments with Mogadishu as a potential threat. Ethiopia and Turkey have had cordial ties since the early 20th century and drew closer in recent years as both battled criticism from the west over domestic policies. History scholar Michael Bishku explains that Turkey’s ties with Ethiopia are largely economic, while those with Somalia are sentimental. Navigating the different interests in the region calls for a delicate balancing act.
Such local and global power plays underscore the Red Sea’s geopolitical importance, with economic and political interests fuelling cooperation and tension. Ultimately, the region’s stability – or lack thereof – has far-reaching consequences for global trade, security and politics.
Kagure Gacheche, Commissioning Editor, East Africa
