As a guarantor of the peace agreement, the African Union must urgently take action to de-escalate political tensions.
On 26 March, security personnel led by South Sudan’s defence minister and national security chief entered First Vice-President Riek Machar’s home, disarmed and removed his security detail, and placed him under house arrest.
The catalyst was his alleged role in recent skirmishes between the Dinka-dominated South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF) and the Nuer militia White Army. These erupted in early March, reportedly triggered by a disagreement over a long overdue rotation of the SSPDF’s soldiers in Nasir garrison.
Information Minister Michael Makuei said the arrests were directed by President Salva Kiir to prevent attacks on government installations and safeguard the 2018 Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS).
The government also arrested several influential opposition ministers and high-ranking military officers from the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition. Airstrikes were authorised in Nasir County and around Juba, and some opposition members have gone into hiding.
National tensions have been rising, with unilateral reshuffles in the transitional government of national unity, including at vice-president level. The reshuffles are allegedly linked to Kiir’s attempt to orchestrate his succession outside the R-ARCSS. This reveals deep mistrust between the country’s two leaders and contravenes the 2018 peace agreement.
Given the African Union’s (AU) prior investment in stabilising South Sudan, swift action is imperative to prevent a complete collapse. This requires a clear understanding of the causes and implications of the evolving crisis, and the immediate options available to the Peace and Security Council (PSC).
The violence in Nasir and other areas is a continuation of intermittent violence, institutional fragility, intense political divisions and exclusionary politics that have characterised South Sudan since independence in 2011.
Due to longstanding mistrust between Kiir and Machar, neither has unified their armed groups into one national force. This mistrust has fuelled secondary fears tied to the uncertainty of elections and attempts to neutralise holdout groups and influential government figures through mediation and reshuffling.
While both leaders are central to national disagreements, conflicts affecting several payams, counties and states overlay national politics, creating a complex interplay between state and national dynamics. In Nasir, national disputes shaped county decisions and snowballed into a pretext to reconfigure transitional government relationships.
Similarly, the struggle to maintain the country’s patronage infrastructure in the army and body politic remains deep-seated. Some interpret Kiir’s repeated cabinet reshuffles as counterproductive efforts to assert control over the transitional government amid waning financial leverage and a failing economy.
The economic downturn is associated with the sharp decline in oil revenues caused by years of financial mismanagement and Sudan’s civil war. Oil accounts for 90% of South Sudan’s revenue and disruptions reduced daily production by about 68% between December 2024 and January 2025. This has undermined political leaders’ efforts to sustain patronage and command the loyalty of their armed factions.
The integrity and sustainability of the R-ARCSS power-sharing arrangement depend on dialogue among the parties. However, Kiir’s unilateral decision making creates the perception that he is consolidating power or preparing for a transition that excludes the opposition and others. The divisions that follow each dismissal have intensified tensions, leading to repeated extensions of the transitional timeframe.
The recent Nasir violence highlights the failure to even minimally implement the R-ARCSS and its milestones, and has reinforced the ongoing economic distress and mistrust amid ethnic tensions. This has brought the country to a crossroads with various possible outcomes, two of which stand out.
First, and most likely, the SSPDF, its associated militia, and armed groups such as the White Army, become entrenched in their positions, attracting additional actors on all sides. Since the Nasir outbreak, all factions have sought revenge for their losses, reinforcing their positions or protecting themselves from perceived threats.
This outcome is supported by the ongoing aerial and ground campaigns against the opposition in parts of the country, particularly outside Juba and in Upper Nile. This is evident in government officials’ increasingly aggressive rhetoric, the postponement of an Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) ministers’ visit, and the engagement of ethnic groups such as the Shilluk and Equatorias.
This outcome could see the collapse of the already precarious peace process. Even the Tumaini high-level process, which was intended to advance the R-ARCSS, is now in limbo.
The less likely second scenario is that Machar and some of his lieutenants receive a conditional release, which could lead to an improved but still tense situation. Taban Deng Gai, the Vice-President responsible for infrastructure, has advised Machar – while he awaits investigation and trial – to renounce the White Army and allow the government to integrate opposition forces into the SSPDF.
However, this would essentially amount to Machar’s surrender – and is improbable, as renouncing the White Army would alienate the opposition leader from the Nuer community.
Such events would undermine Machar and create opportunities for Kiir’s chosen transition actors to dominate the political scene. The degree to which Kiir continues to limit Machar’s power will depend largely on Machar’s influence in preventing the ascent of Kiir’s preferred successors.
At the crossroads of these two scenarios is a slim window to salvage the peace process. However, it will become increasingly difficult to address the complex dynamics, including South Sudan’s military agreement with Uganda, which may extend beyond the AU Panel of the Wise’s scope.
In light of possible escalation, the AU – as an R-ARCSS guarantor – must act fast to support ongoing regional de-escalation measures. In addition to PSC meetings and calling for the AU High-Level Ad Hoc Committee of Five on South Sudan to support IGAD efforts, the AU could create a contact group with IGAD to focus on day-to-day de-escalation measures. A start would be establishing what happened in Nasir and who is responsible.
The PSC should try to secure the release not just of Machar but all opposition officials arbitrarily detained. The officials should also be reinstated in the structures outlined by the R-ARCSS.
These actions are vital to maintain the integrity of the power-sharing agreement. Delayed regional and continental engagement could see violence worsen and the window to salvage the peace process closing further.
This article was first published in the ISS’ PSC Report.
Moses Chrispus Okello, Senior Researcher, Horn of Africa Security Analysis, ISS Addis Ababa
Andrews Atta-Asamoah, Head, African Peace and Security Governance, ISS
Selam Tadesse Demissie, Researcher, Horn of Africa Security Analysis, ISS Addis Ababa
