Cape Town — The African Union chose its new leadership, and now faces several peace and security challenges which the International Crisis Group (ICG) described as “forbidding”. This is an extract of ICG’s briefing points to eight areas where the organisation can put its diplomatic weight to particularly good use.
For more, read the full February 6 briefing with graphics.
1. Renewing AU Leadership on Peace and Security
The forthcoming AU leadership votes come at a consequential moment for the organisation, as it contends with conflict in every corner of the continent. On 15 February, African heads of state will elect a chairperson of the AU Commission to replace Moussa Faki Mahamat, who will step down after two terms. They will also choose a deputy chairperson and fill six other critical slots. Of these positions, the chair is the most closely watched, given its high visibility, even if the actual power vested in the office is limited. Member states take all the major decisions on the institution’s behalf. But the chair has an important platform, which the person holding it can use to lay out vision, suggest direction to the organisation and member states, and help formulate and drive collective responses to the continent’s peace and security crises. The chairperson’s key mandate is to lend diplomatic weight to peacemaking efforts where they are most needed in Africa. There will be no shortage of work.
Outgoing chair Faki, who took up the position in 2017, is widely seen as having a mixed record. He is credited with renewing the organisation’s partnerships with the UN and the European Union. He also steered the African Continental Free Trade Area agreement, a ground-breaking 2018 deal that aims to reduce regulatory obstacles to continental trade. Faki’s second term was not without controversy, however. For instance, he supported the decision by member states not to suspend his home country, Chad, after an unconstitutional change of government in April 2021, undermining a core AU principle, memorialised in the Lomé Declaration of 2000, which holds that the AU should suspend states following coups d’état, lifting the sanction only after they have held elections and returned to civilian rule.
[Moussa Faki Mahamat’s] most enduring legacy will likely be his chaotic management of the AU’s response to the Sudanese civil war.
For more, read the full February 6 briefing with graphics.
But Faki’s most enduring legacy will likely be his chaotic management of the AU’s response to the Sudanese civil war that broke out in April 2023. With the U.S. distracted by the conflict in Ukraine, and other outsiders (eg, the Arab Gulf powers) reportedly lining up behind one or the other of the two main sides in Sudan, strong African leadership was desperately needed. Yet when the Horn of Africa regional bloc the Intergovernmental Organisation for Development’s (IGAD) mediation effort ran aground, Faki was unable to raise the alarm about the severity of the crisis and muster an effective AU response.
There are three candidates to replace Faki as chair. In line with a system of regional rotation adopted in March 2024, all three hail from eastern Africa. They are Kenya’s former prime minister, Raila Odinga; Djibouti’s foreign minister, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf; and the former finance minister of Madagascar, Richard Randriamandrato. Odinga and Youssouf are viewed as the front runners and have both mounted energetic campaigns. Odinga contends that he is best placed to bring the AU greater political clout, due to his high name recognition and Kenya’s stature as a major African power. He says he would be best able to get the ear of heads of state when attempting mediation. Youssouf offers a contrasting profile, with his supporters making the case he will add management capacity to a commission consistently criticised by member states as sclerotic and ineffective. He boasts considerable knowledge of AU institutions.
Whoever prevails will have his work cut out for him. The obstacles to being an effective chair are many. Unlike the European Union, whose member states have handed certain powers to a supranational EU Commission, the AU is an intergovernmental organisation whose members have accorded it no measure of sovereignty. Real power lies with member states and, while enjoying prestige, the chairperson has little if any capacity to direct their actions. Still, an effective chair can draw upon the AU’s unique legitimacy among Africans to bring diplomatic focus to bear on the continent’s worst peace and security crises – a distinction for which the humanitarian catastrophe in Sudan and the potentially explosive conflict in the eastern DRC are now vying. Working to put out those fires should be the new chair’s top priority.
Another key issue that the new chair will need to wrestle with relates to the organisation’s role in promoting good governance in accordance with the Lomé principles. At present, the AU has suspended Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Guinea, Gabon and Sudan after the military grabbed power in these countries. Typically, the AU lifts a suspension when an errant member state returns to constitutional rule after democratic elections. This approach appeared to work well in the early 2000s with a number of military regimes handing the reins back to civilians. But today the prospects of such reversals are far dimmer. In a new global age of impunity, it appears there is little chance any of the more recent coups, particularly those in the central Sahel, will be turned around anytime soon. Of the regimes in suspended countries, only the junta in Gabon has shown an interest in working to restore relations with the AU.
There is a growing realisation … that it is important to keep open lines of communication with military regimes.
The AU thus faces a considerable dilemma. There is no prospect of the organisation revising the Lomé Declaration, given its importance in outlining the need to consolidate democracy on the continent. At the same time, there is a growing realisation, voiced most prominently in recent months by the leaders of two important West African democracies, Ghana and Senegal, that it is important to keep open lines of communication with military regimes. Section 5 below offers a suggestion for how the AU may be able to help with that, while maintaining its commitment to promoting democratic principles.
For more, read the full February 6 briefing with graphics.
Finally, a critical task of the incoming chairman will be to harness the AU’s stature as an institution that speaks for the continent. He should attempt to present the views of African countries in global debates when representing the AU in meetings of the Group of Twenty (G20) economic forum. He should encourage AU member states to fast-track common positions on issues where they agree, such as negotiating climate financing and lobbying for the reform of international financial institutions. The AU has completed a draft common position on climate, peace and security for its Peace and Security Council (PSC) members to discuss later in 2025. The AU chairperson should push for its adoption.
AU member states tend to expect more from the commission than it can deliver, but that is not a reason for the new chair to shrink from an ambitious agenda. As competition intensifies on the continent for influence and access to minerals and hydrocarbons, notably at present in the DRC but also in the Central African Republic, Mali and Zimbabwe, and big-power rivalry reshapes the institutions meant to ensure global cooperation, the time is right for a chairperson who will promote continental unity in addressing common problems and amplify Africa’s voice in an increasingly polarised world.
2. Supporting Sudan Mediation Efforts
The Sudanese state is on the brink of collapse. In April 2023, a dispute between the Sudanese army, led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), headed by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo “Hemedti”, over merging the latter into the former escalated into open warfare. Fighting broke out first in the capital Khartoum and rapidly spread across much of the country. With external backers helping sustain both belligerents – the United Arab Emirates is the RSF’s primary supporter, while Egypt is the army’s – the two sides feel they can gain more on the battlefield than at the peace table. Mediation efforts have therefore struggled. Although there are limits to what the AU can do to end the conflict, it could be doing more to call international attention to the crisis, press the warring parties into serious mediation and support discussions among Sudanese civilian groups about a political way forward.
The costs of Sudan’s civil war are hard to exaggerate. It has created the world’s worst humanitarian crisis. Over 3.2 million people have fled to neighbouring countries such as Egypt, Chad, South Sudan and Ethiopia. An estimated 12 million Sudanese are displaced and 26 million face acute food shortages. The Trump administration’s confusing foreign aid cuts, though they include carveouts for life-saving humanitarian assistance, could leave even more Sudanese hungry. All the warring parties have subjected women and girls to sexual violence on a major scale.
International actors have struggled to respond to the conflict. Efforts to convene face-to-face discussions between Burhan and Hemedti or their senior representatives have largely come to nothing. High-profile initiatives to date have included two rounds of talks in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, mediated by the kingdom and the U.S. (May and October 2023); discussions in Manama, Bahrain, organised by Egypt and the UAE (January 2024); and U.S.-led negotiations in Geneva (August 2024). In recent weeks, Türkiye has been trying to kickstart direct talks between the Sudanese army and the RSF’s Emirati backers, but it is too early to assess whether that effort will bear fruit.
Behind this dismal record is a lack of motivation on both sides. Outside backers have propped up both the main belligerents, preventing either from dealing its foe a knockout punch and allowing both to keep fighting. The RSF, which had momentum for much of the conflict, controls most of the country’s western reaches and has recently moved into new areas in the south along the borders with South Sudan and Ethiopia. The army, which considers itself the country’s sovereign, is strongest in the north and east. In the last two months, the pendulum appears to have swung in its favour, starting with its capture (assisted, apparently, by Iran-supplied drones) of Wad Medani, an important city in Gezira state. On 24 January, the army then swept into Bahri, to Khartoum’s north, ending the RSF’s months-long siege of the army headquarters there. It was a major morale boost for the armed forces and a significant blow to the RSF, whose units withdrew without much of a fight, just as they had in Wad Medani. Still, even if the army manages to keep pushing the RSF out of the capital, the civil war looks set to rage on, especially in Darfur. Momentum could switch again.
The [Sudanese] army will not speak to the RSF … and rejects the inclusion of the UAE … at peace talks.
Beyond each party’s sense that it can do better on the battlefield than at the peace table, there are other challenges to peacemaking efforts. The army will not speak to the RSF, which it calls a terrorist group, and rejects the inclusion of the UAE, which it (correctly) sees as the RSF’s prime enabler, at peace talks. Islamists associated with ousted authoritarian ruler Omar al-Bashir have joined forces with the army, seeking a return to power, alarming numerous African, Arab and Western governments as well as many Sudanese. Alliances that the army has struck with former rebel groups outside the country’s riverine centre complicate the picture. So, too, do questions about how to bring the views of civilian leaders and local communities into the frame. With both sides credibly reported to have committed atrocities, and both wishing to play a role in post-war governance, it is hard to imagine a settlement that will be embraced by the people who have suffered their abuses.
In these difficult circumstances, the AU has understandably struggled to influence the course of events – though internal squabbling among officials over who should lead on the file has hardly helped. A roadmap for mediation and humanitarian assistance the AU drew up in May 2023 – right after the war began – was quickly rendered obsolete. A high-level panel formed in January 2024 has foundered so far because it lacks the political heft to compete with the other mediation initiatives. But the AU does have powers of moral suasion that it has been too reticent to use. While African leaders often ignore criticism from abroad, they are more hesitant to dismiss their peers. Megaphone diplomacy from the leadership of the AU – which still enjoys wide popular support across the continent – could have placed considerable pressure on the belligerents.
For more, read the full February 6 briefing with graphics.
The forthcoming election for a new AU Commission chair is an opportunity for a reset. The new chair could throw his full weight behind decrying the senseless bloodshed and urging the parties to come to the peace table. To create a bandwagon effect, he could call an extraordinary summit of AU heads of state to come up with new ways to actively encourage and support talks between the belligerents. The chair should also seek opportunities for AU participation in the most promising negotiation efforts of non-African powers.
In parallel, the AU high-level panel, supported by the chair, should persist in trying to get Sudanese political and civil society actors around the table, in the hope that dialogue might create the scaffolding for a viable track to discuss options for a caretaker civilian administration once mediators achieve a ceasefire. Veteran AU diplomat Mohammed Ibn Chambas – who was appointed to lead the panel in January 2024 – should coordinate these efforts to supercharge the civilian track, perhaps working with Egypt, which made its own effort to bring civilian politicians together in July 2024. Given the tensions among various Sudanese civilian groups, it will be important for Chambas and his team to remain painstakingly neutral as they work to plant the seeds of a post-war Sudan.
3. Averting a Regional War in the Great Lakes
The conflict in the eastern DRC escalated dramatically on 27 January. M23 rebels, aided by Rwandan forces, equipment and firepower, marched into the east’s biggest city, Goma, routing the Congolese army and its allies. The M23 has since steadily advanced toward Bukavu, capital of neighbouring South Kivu province, though it announced a unilateral ceasefire on 4 February, pausing that charge for now. The humanitarian situation is dire, with hundreds of thousands in displacement camps forced to flee once more. Artillery used by both sides has inflicted a high toll on civilians. Diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict are in disarray, with African leaders competing to take up the mantle. The heads of states involved in the conflict should urgently tone down their bellicose statements, which risk sparking wider war. Other neighbours can do their part by pressing for a negotiated ceasefire and a single mediation process to explore options for de-escalation and resolution at a forthcoming joint summit of the East and Southern Africa regional blocs.
The fall of Goma, along with the refusal of Kigali and Kinshasa to show flexibility to each other to make talks possible, could set off a conflagration reminiscent of the late 1990s and early 2000s when armies from across central and southern Africa got involved in prolonged fighting in the eastern DRC. The risk is especially acute considering the number of external actors involved. As the M23 and Rwandan forces advanced on Goma, they fought South African, Malawian, Tanzanian and Burundian troops whom Kinshasa had invited to battle the rebels. They also encountered members of one of the world’s largest UN peacekeeping missions. All forces took casualties, creating considerable bad blood.
Mostly dormant since their last major incursion into the eastern DRC in 2012, the M23 suddenly resurged in November 2021. They pushed deep into North Kivu province, repeatedly driving back Congo’s ill-equipped and unmotivated soldiers, as well as the motley group of auxiliaries fighting by their side. After peace talks broke down in mid-December 2024, the M23 launched a major offensive capturing a number of key towns, including Masisi and Minova, culminating in the capture of Goma on 27 January.
Even before their sweep into Goma, the M23 and Rwandans had entrenched themselves in conquered parts of North Kivu.
Both sides have upped the ante since Goma fell. On 29 January, Congolese President Félix Tshisekedi promised a “vigorous, coordinated response” to Kigali’s aggression and called on his citizens to mobilise. The next day, the M23’s political head stated the group’s intention to “march on Kinshasa”. 15 Even before their sweep into Goma, the M23 and Rwandans had entrenched themselves in conquered parts of North Kivu, replacing local leaders and grabbing control of the richest coltan and gold deposits. Hostile rhetoric on social media has reached fever-pitch, involving both Congolese and Rwandan citizens.
Mediation efforts over the past several years have struggled to influence the parties. In 2022, AU heads of state asked President João Lourenço to bring Rwandan President Paul Kagame and Tshisekedi to the negotiating table. Known as the Luanda process, this track led to a ceasefire in July 2024 and later an understanding that committed Kigali to withdraw its troops from the east. For its part, Kinshasa pledged to “neutralise” the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (commonly known as FDLR, the French acronym), an anti-Kigali group made up of remnants of the troops who committed the 1994 genocide. These working-level commitments came to naught, however, when they reached the presidents’ offices, and a summit planned for 15 December 2o24 in Angola collapsed as Kagame withdrew at the last minute, followed by a now familiar exchange of bombast.
The December summit’s failure, which may have primed the pump for the latest round of fighting, is hardly a surprise given deep mutual grievance and distrust. Kinshasa does not believe Rwanda’s claims that the FDLR seriously threatens its security; instead, it says, Rwanda is using the FDLR as a pretext to occupy the eastern DRC. President Tshisekedi also refuses to sit down with the rebels, describing the M23 as a Rwandan proxy – though it is an open question whether he can sustain this posture with the M23 in de facto control of the Kivus.
For its part, Kigali has made no move to withdraw from the east. Rather, it has deployed thousands of troops, supported the attack on Goma and implanted new administrations in areas it controls. It continues to insist that peace can come only through negotiations between Kinshasa and the M23, arguing that the insurgency is a purely domestic rather than a regional problem. Ample evidence that Kigali has deployed troops to back the M23, however, undermines this contention.
The conflict [in the DRC] has proven hugely divisive across the continent.
The conflict has proven hugely divisive across the continent, making mediators’ challenge that much greater, and rifts have widened even further after Goma’s fall. Since the fighting broke out in 2021, some African leaders and senior officials have been sympathetic to Rwanda’s stated security concerns, while others share Kinshasa’s frustration about Kigali’s behaviour and are concerned that Rwanda’s use of force – possibly with the goal of redrawing borders – sets a dangerous precedent, violating the AU’s commitment to respect colonial-era boundaries. 21
Broadly speaking, allegiances fall along geographic lines. Southern African countries have aligned with Kinshasa, while the East African Community (EAC), excepting Burundi, favours Kigali. One reason for the geographic split is the history of military deployments in the eastern DRC. Through a combination of pressure and negotiation (but no significant fighting), the EAC contingent dispatched in 2022 pushed the M23 away from major towns, but Kinshasa wanted East African forces to confront the rebels militarily. The mission ended in acrimony after Tshisekedi demanded they leave, to be replaced by a southern African force with troops from South Africa, Malawi and Tanzania and a bilateral deployment by Burundi. This last country deployed thousands of troops in North and South Kivu, suffering considerable losses, which stoked tensions at home. Given that Burundi is a key ally of Kinshasa, some African diplomats now fear that Kigali and its allies may seek to overthrow its government. Rounding out the picture, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni’s influential son has openly welcomed the M23’s advances, and Kampala materially backs the rebels, though quietly.
Goma’s fall has triggered both new spats and new diplomacy. South African President Cyril Ramaphosa accused the Rwandan army, together with the M23, of responsibility for the deaths of thirteen South African soldiers (the reported toll has since risen to fourteen), eliciting a furious reaction from Kagame. But leaders of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) – the southern regional counterpart to the EAC – called for an immediate ceasefire and urged all states and armed groups to return to talks. The EAC did as well. At separate summits on 29 and 31 January, leaders of the two blocs called for a joint EAC-SADC summit to chart a path forward, although hard feelings (from the Ramaphosa-Kagame dust-up) and deep fault lines remain. The gathering is due to take place on 8 February.
The PSC has been careful not to take sides in the conflict [in the DRC], given the regional rifts.
For its part, the AU summoned a Peace and Security Council meeting on 29 January. PSC ministers decided to continue backing Lourenço’s efforts and again urged the Rwandan and Congolese leaders to negotiate. Angola will assume the AU rotating chairmanship on 15 February, though it is unclear if it is keen to continue leading on the Congo file. The PSC has been careful not to take sides in the conflict, given the regional rifts. At its PSC meeting, it called for all external actors supporting the M23 to withdraw from the eastern DRC, without naming Rwanda.
Given the stakes, it is vital that African leaders patch up their differences, or at the very least tone down their rhetoric, and turn their concerted efforts to pulling the warring parties back to the negotiating table. Although they are unlikely to pressure Kigali in public, Africa’s leaders should make clear to President Kagame that Rwandan actions in the Kivus clearly violate AU norms demanding respect for sovereign borders – and they should demand that Kigali make plans to retreat from Goma and other cities. They should also urge Kinshasa to soften its stance on diplomatic protocols and agree to dialogue with the M23 alongside this pressure as, despite Kigali being in the driving seat, there are few other conceivable options for a sustainable solution in the longer term.
The public bickering between Ramaphosa and Kagame following the fall of Goma has been especially damaging to efforts to chart a peaceful course forward, and the two leaders should mend fences as best and as quickly they can. Even so, the foreign ministers of South Africa and Rwanda discussed relations during a telephone call on 30 January. They could continue to explore ways to de-escalate. As a first step, the M23 and their Rwandan allies should give safe passage to South African and other troops trapped near Goma, a move that might help lower the temperature between Pretoria and Kigali. The rebels should also allow in much-needed humanitarian assistance, an effort which should be coordinated with UN agencies.
Finally, as for the joint EAC-SADC summit, leaders should urge the belligerent parties to agree to a negotiated ceasefire, as well as a single track for advancing negotiations between Kigali and Kinshasa. To lend momentum to such efforts, the new AU commission chairperson who will be elected on 15 February and his team should signal approval of the summit outcome, offer to host discussions where needed and be ready with AU diplomatic and technical support to help avert what could too easily blow up into a devastating wider war.
4. Launching Another AU Force in Somalia
The AU is a key source of support for the Somali government as it works to build up its security forces and battle the Al-Shabaab insurgency. The AU military mission, in place since 2007, was due to pull out in December 2024, but Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud asked that it stay. Mogadishu has not made sufficient progress in fighting Al-Shabaab to go it alone. A campaign in late 2022 that recovered territory in central Somalia fizzled before it could head to the south, where Al-Shabaab is strongest. It was hampered by political disputes, clan tensions and a Somali army that is still very much in development mode. The AU needs to find the funds needed for a revamped force, help the Somali government secure troop contributions and steer the country to the point where further AU missions are unnecessary.
The newly minted AU Support and Stabilisation Mission to Somalia (AUSSOM) began operations in January. Its mandate is to support the Somali army in fighting Al-Shabaab, protect urban infrastructure, help enable humanitarian aid delivery and support state building. Despite its new name, AUSSOM is essentially a continuation of the previous African Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) (2022-2024) and will step into the latter’s shoes over a six-month period. AUSSOM’s nearly 12,000 troops – close to half the peak strength of the original African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) (2007-2022) – will be spread over about twenty bases in Somalia, down from approximately 80 in 2022. Most of these bases are near either strategic towns or important sites like airports.
The guiding idea behind this reconfiguration is for the mission to hold critical nodes while freeing up Somali troops to go after Al-Shabaab. Still, the AU will also need to play a supporting role in Somali operations. Despite the substantial efforts of numerous foreign instructors, Somalia’s armed forces struggle to make battlefield gains without outside help.
As the AU prepares to provide this support, it will need to work with Mogadishu to address key questions. The first is who will pay for the mission. In theory, part of the answer could lie in New York. In December 2024, the UN Security Council tentatively approved funding for AUSSOM through a new mechanism that allows the Council to cover up to 75 per cent of the costs of AU peace operations from UN assessed contributions. But the money will not flow until July and is conditioned on final Council approval, based on a vote to be taken in May. The previous U.S. administration abstained on the December resolution, taking the position that the new UN financing mechanism should be used for missions that are primarily offensive and time-limited in nature (AUSSOM fits neither bill). The new administration of President Donald Trump is almost sure to take an even more jaundiced view of an arrangement it can cast as costing U.S. taxpayers.
The mission has also yet to find enough troops. The initial expectation was that the five ATMIS troop contributors – Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda – would renew their commitments to minimise disruption. That plan came under strain when it seemed that a dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia (over the latter’s plans to secure a port in breakaway Somaliland) might keep Addis Ababa from sending soldiers. Turkish mediation has healed that rift, but there will still be changes: Burundi is set to depart the mission; Egypt is likely to provide a small number of specialist personnel; and specific troop commitments and important logistical arrangements are not yet nailed down.
The AU’s tasks relating to its work in Somalia start with the need to secure adequate financing.
Against this backdrop, the AU’s tasks relating to its work in Somalia start with the need to secure adequate financing. It will be a tall order. Certainly, it makes sense to take all possible steps to create the best odds for a successful Security Council vote in May. These include fulfilling UN requirements regarding monitoring, financial and international law compliance; coming up with clear costing for the mission; and demonstrating that the AU can shoulder the 25 per cent share that will be its burden (though it can seek help from the UN and bilateral donors). Another step is to work closely in the related diplomacy with Somalia, which began its term as an elected member of the Security Council in January, as well as with Algeria and Sierra Leone, which are the Council’s other African members. They will need to engage U.S. officials both in Congress and in New York, where former Congresswoman Elise Stefanik is almost sure to become the new U.S. permanent representative.
Yet given the possibly insurmountable challenges of securing Washington’s support in an era of U.S. retrenchment, contingency planning will also be key. That means reaching out to traditional and non-traditional donors to see what they can provide – from the EU and UK to new prospects such as Türkiye, the Gulf Arab states, Japan and China (some of which have reportedly already pledged small amounts). It may also be necessary to consider what a slimmed-down mission might look like in case funding comes in at levels insufficient to support the current scope. 31 For their part, donors should consider the security risks that would come with a smaller mission, which would allow Al-Shabaab greater running room and pile additional pressure on the overstretched Somali forces.
Secondly, the AU should work on smoothing out remaining issues relating to troop contributions. The AU and the Somali government urgently need to agree on exactly how many troops each country will be asked to contribute and where they will be based. Most will likely take up positions similar to what they had as part of ATMIS, but there are likely to be changes in areas like Middle Shabelle, Bay and Bakool. These questions require attention if the mission reconfiguration is to be complete by July.
The AU, the Somali government and its partners will need to ensure that the mission does what the others failed to do by fully drawing down on time by 2029.
Finally, the AU, the Somali government and its partners will need to ensure that the mission does what the others failed to do by fully drawing down on time by 2029. Part of the challenge is that the mission’s exit strategy relies on Somalia to develop capacity to take over full security responsibility, something largely beyond the AU’s control. What AUSSOM can do, though, is to design its operations with capacity building in mind, especially in areas where the Somali armed forces are lacking – from certain field competencies to logistical resupply.
Addressing Somalia’s manifold security challenges will also require political solutions – including dialogue to overcome the fractious relationship between the government and Somalia’s member states. Recurrent tensions over power and resource sharing undercut cooperation in fighting the common enemy, Al-Shabaab, making it difficult to plan and sustain operations. Should the circumstances arise where a constructive dialogue with Al-Shabaab seems possible, this option should not be excluded, given how hard it is to conceive of an all-out military victory over the entrenched insurgency. Thus, while providing a security blanket is important, the AU should work through the AU Commission and PSC to prod the government toward steps that can advance the goal of making this AU mission the last one in Somalia.
5. Searching for Ways to Engage the Central Sahel
The AU is struggling to find a role for itself in the central Sahel, which has seen a rash of coups in recent years – six in the last three alone. Efforts by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to reverse the trend have failed. After Niger’s armed forces ousted President Mohamed Bazoum in July 2023, the bloc imposed harsh sanctions and threatened to intervene militarily, but this gambit failed to steer the country back to constitutional rule. Instead, Niger joined two other military-led regional states – Burkina Faso and Mali – to form the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), which the members described as a “defensive pact”. The three countries have since expanded their alliance, which they now refer to as a “confederation”, announcing a joint military force and a communications platform, among other initiatives. 33 The AES states appear determined to chart their own course, but the AU should still explore openings to smooth neighbourhood relations. It should appoint an empowered envoy tasked with supporting mediation, while sustaining dialogue between the AES and the AU.
West Africa’s regional bloc ECOWAS – which works for deep economic and social integration among member states and in years past engaged in assertive peacemaking – is facing one of its biggest challenges to date. In early 2024, the three AES members announced they would be withdrawing from ECOWAS. The trio rejected a December 2024 ECOWAS proposal for a six-month transition period before the bloc would consider their departure definitive and all appear set to leave. With reconciliation seeming unlikely for now, ECOWAS and the AES should focus on negotiating an amicable divorce that blunts the impact on the people who will have to live with the separation’s effects. Priorities should include keeping seaports and roadways open to the landlocked central Sahel and maintaining free movement between ECOWAS and AES member states. Thankfully, each side has promised to keep borders open to citizens of the other’s member states, but it remains uncertain how these issues will play out in the months to come. Making formal commitments would be useful.
For more, read the full February 6 briefing with graphics.
Meantime, the security situation in the region is fraught. All three AES regimes have sundered military and political cooperation with France, which was previously their principal external partner, and other Western governments. Instead, they have sought closer ties with Russia. Moscow supports Burkina Faso and Niger with military advisers, Mali with troops (through the Africa Corps, as the mercenary Wagner Group is now known) and all three with arms. Türkiye is also an important source of weaponry, particularly drones. But this change has not stemmed the spread of violence across the region. 2023 was the deadliest year on record for the Sahel, with nearly 14,000 fatalities related to armed groups, with 2024 a close second, and nothing to suggest that the trend will materially improve. The Islamist insurgency with the biggest reach, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, is active in all three countries. Overall, more than 3 million people in the region are displaced and one in five need humanitarian assistance.
While the AU has traditionally taken a back seat to ECOWAS … it took on several important roles at the outset of the security crisis in the Sahel.
While the AU has traditionally taken a back seat to ECOWAS when it comes to conflict resolution in West Africa, in line with the AU’s subsidiarity principle, which allocates primary responsibility to regional blocs, it took on several important roles at the outset of the security crisis in the Sahel. In 2013, the AU was instrumental in supporting elections that completed Mali’s transition back to civilian rule, after rapid jihadist advances the previous year had led to a coup d’état. In January 2013, it briefly deployed troops to the country before being replaced by a UN stabilisation mission, MINUSMA, with a large proportion of West African peacekeepers. 36 But the organisation has not named an envoy for its only office in the central Sahel, MISAHEL in Bamako, since September 2023, illustrating the extent to which its influence in the region has diminished.
But, as the central Sahel pulls away from ECOWAS politically and diplomatically, there may be more that the AU could usefully do to complement ECOWAS’ efforts. To be sure, relations between the AU and the central Sahelian administrations are strained, due to the fact the AU suspended all three countries following their respective coups. Nonetheless, the continental organisation, unlike ECOWAS, has largely refrained from messy public clashes with the AES’ authorities. The AU, for example, did not impose targeted economic sanctions or travel bans on the three, and it was reticent about supporting ECOWAS’ threats of a military intervention in Niger in 2023.
Thus, there may still be room for the AU to play a diplomatic role in the Sahel. While the Lomé principles mean that the AU cannot lift suspensions on the AES members until they return to civilian rule, it could step up its engagement by staffing its Bamako office with a well-funded Sahel envoy, something Crisis Group has previously advocated. To have meaningful impact, the envoy should be a senior diplomat with sufficient international standing to meet regional heads of state. The envoy will also need to demonstrate a clear commitment to hearing out the AES countries’ concerns after a decade of limited contact with them. The organisation’s tone should be as neutral as possible, and its emphasis should be on maintaining regional integration – ie, on avoiding an end state that isolates the AES members from their neighbours and from continental structures to the detriment of their citizens and the entire region.
The AU should also consider other ways in which to engage with countries in the central Sahel. The AU PSC took a decision in late 2023 to hold regular dialogues with countries suspended from the organisation, a formula that puts these states in a sort of “halfway house” where they can still discuss matters with African ambassadors in Addis Ababa, albeit on an informal basis. In June 2024, the PSC also, for the first time, held a meeting of its subcommittee on sanctions, dedicated to tracking the situation in countries suspended from the AU. The new subcommittee is tasked with investigating the causes of unconstitutional changes of government, monitoring the effect of sanctions on citizens and advising the AU about adapting its strategies. The organisation is right to stick with its stance against power grabs, but as the Sahel situation demonstrates, new tools for advancing that agenda could certainly be useful.
6. Helping Cameroon Organise Credible Elections
Fighting resurged in Cameroon’s North West and South West regions in 2024 amid continental indifference to the plight of the Anglophone minority concentrated there. Clashes intensified between government forces and militias demanding secession from Cameroon, which comprises eight Francophone regions as well as the two English-speaking ones, with observers registering a record number of kidnappings and assaults on civilians. In the Far North region, the Boko Haram insurgency stepped up attacks on the army and civilians. Tensions are rising in the capital Yaoundé, too, as President Paul Biya hints at seeking re-election in October, when he will be 92. Many civil society figures, including influential Catholic bishops, have asked him not to run again, given his advanced age, the unresolved conflicts and economic hardship. Regime insiders are jockeying for position in the post-Biya era that will eventually arrive. Amid these strains, the AU should help develop a resolution of the Anglophone conflict and support a smooth election, including by preparing an observation mission.
For more, read the full February 6 briefing with graphics.
Eight years of near-daily violence and disruption are testing the resilience of the two Anglophone regions’ residents. Aid workers estimate that 1.8 million people need some form of assistance, including hundreds of thousands of children who are bereft of regular education due to school closures imposed by the separatists. Half a million people are internally displaced, while an additional 100,000 have sought refuge in neighbouring Nigeria. The conflict drew international attention in September 2024, when Norway charged Lucas Ayaba Cho, commander of the Ambazonia Defence Forces, an Anglophone insurgent group, with incitement to commit crimes against humanity, an accusation he contests. But for all the signals of prospects for accountability, the arrest has thus far not curbed militia activities on the ground.
Indeed, Cameroon’s separatist leaders seem determined to double down, wagering on the absence of sustained peace efforts. Some are developing cross-border alliances, notably Ayaba Cho’s faction, which has signed a cooperation agreement with secessionists in Nigeria’s south east advocating for the creation of an independent Biafra state. This alliance, which is meant to widen the pool of weapons and information available to both groups, appears to have triggered a spate of raids by Biafra militias on the oil-rich Bakassi peninsula. These attacks have introduced yet another layer of complexity to the seemingly intractable Anglophone conflict.
At the same time, the forthcoming presidential poll will divert Yaoundé’s gaze from the crises in the country’s periphery. President Biya has indicated that he wants to extend his 42-year term in office. Moreover, ethnic and political tensions are likely to flare if the government falls back on the fraud-prone multiple ballot system the country has used in past votes. Opposition candidates have previously decried what they describe as systematic manipulation in the ruling party’s favour, but the Constitutional Council, which adjudicates electoral disputes and whose head is appointed by the president, has dismissed their challenges.
Insecurity and logistical hurdles in [Cameroon’s] Anglophone regions and the Far North could … damage the vote’s credibility.
Insecurity and logistical hurdles in both the Anglophone regions and the Far North could also damage the vote’s credibility. Anglophone separatists have already said they plan to prevent over one million voters in the North West and South West from casting ballots. The Far North, meanwhile, is plagued by insurgent attacks and the aftermath of unprecedented floods that swept away houses, inundated farmland and drowned thousands of livestock.
The AU tends to largely ignore Cameroon. Its latest significant engagement occurred in 2018, when it sent a mission to observe the presidential vote. The AU Commission chair, the Chadian Moussa Faki Mahamat, has visited Yaoundé twice, in 2018 and 2019. But the AU PSC has never put the Anglophone crisis on its agenda and, apart from Faki’s visits, the Commission has not discussed the issue with Cameroonian authorities, either. Officials in Addis Ababa are understandably leery of getting involved, given Yaoundé’s resistance to what it regards as outside interference. But with conflict seeping into Nigeria, the AU should at least consider offering to mediate a political track to build on the 2022 pre-talks facilitated by Canada. The PSC could support such an effort by asking the AU Commission for regular updates on developments in the Anglophone conflict. This measure could help lend momentum to diplomacy and keep Yaoundé focused on the need for a political resolution.
In at least one sense, the timing is propitious for greater AU involvement. The election year offers the AU an inroad to step up engagement with Yaoundé. The AU should deploy a long-term election observation mission that – after revisiting the recommendations of the report produced by the mission deployed in 2018 – could nudge Cameroonian authorities to carry them out. The recommendations include technical proposals to bolster the independence of the electoral management body and to streamline voting by printing candidates’ names on a single ballot rather than using the multiple ballot system that has eroded Cameroonian citizens’ trust in elections.
The election observers could also stress the importance of protecting the franchise for internally displaced people in the Anglophone and Far North regions, for example by simplifying registration and allowing them to vote in the places where they are living temporarily. Finally, in support of the new mission, the new AU chair could offer to visit Cameroon before voting day to demonstrate his personal commitment to a fair, credible presidential election that adheres to AU guidelines. In addition to being beneficial in their own right, these efforts could help re-establish the AU as a diplomatic presence in Cameroon, positioning it to help find a political solution to the Anglophone conflict.
7. Preventing South Sudan from Capsizing
While South Sudan is no stranger to crisis, its stability now looks especially precarious amid mounting pressures from the civil war in neighbouring Sudan. For nearly a year, the war has halted most of South Sudan’s oil exports, the country’s main source of revenue, after the pipeline transporting the crude to Port Sudan on the Red Sea fell into disrepair. The cratering economy has opened political rifts in the capital Juba and is arguably exacerbating violence in the country’s peripheral regions. South Sudanese President Salva Kiir has been forced to try to stay friendly with both warring sides in Sudan, a tenuous balancing act. Hundreds of thousands of Sudanese refugees have also streamed into South Sudan. Besides doing everything it can to end the war in Sudan, the AU can help South Sudan gird itself for these turbulent times by urging powerful member states, such as South Africa and Kenya, to press its political class to forge a pact capable of withstanding the stresses the country faces. The AU, through a new special representative, should support that process.
South Sudan’s problems are enormous, starting with an economy in catastrophic straits. The country’s oil wealth has kept afloat the coalition government formed in 2020 in the aftermath of a 2018 agreement signed by Kiir and other opposition leaders, including Riek Machar. 51 The pipeline rupture in February 2024 not only triggered a steep increase in inflation and a currency depreciation, but also strained Kiir’s patronage network. In late 2024, Kiir abruptly fired four powerful officials in what observers say was a move to eradicate potential challengers within the security apparatus, replacing the internal security chief of the National Security Service, the commander of the presidential guards, the army head and the police inspector general. While Kiir has so far kept a tight grip on politics, inter-elite rivalry risks sparking violent conflict among various factions of the ruling Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM).
Compounding South Sudan’s challenges are the massive humanitarian needs of displaced people living in the country. Over 900,000 people have fled from Sudan to South Sudan since the Sudanese civil war broke out in April 2023. This population includes hundreds of thousands who left South Sudan during its own 2013-2018 civil war but have now returned. Separately, severe flooding in mid-2024 has left thousands of South Sudanese short of food.
Driven by such desperation, many thousands of young South Sudanese men appear to be fighting in the war in Sudan as low-grade mercenaries, meaning they may pose a threat to security when they come home. At least one South Sudanese rebel leader claims an alliance with the RSF, while others have longstanding ties to its foe, the Sudanese army. Kiir himself has tried to maintain workable relations with both Hemedti and Burhan, given that he needs the cooperation of both to export oil, stabilise the economy and ward off any challenge to his rule. Continued success at this tightrope act is not assured.
Many South Sudanese worry that local clashes could expand dramatically if political infighting continues.
Against this backdrop, much of the country appears to be coming apart at the seams. The deteriorating economic picture, together with upheaval in the security sector and a growing sense of anarchy, have fuelled violence across the periphery. Recent months have seen inter-factional fighting, sometimes involving the state and other times not, in Upper Nile, Warrap, Jonglei, Unity, Central Equatoria and other states. Fury at the ill treatment of South Sudanese in Sudan’s civil war has been another trigger. In January, unrest shook Juba and locales across the country, as residents reacted to the purposeful killing of South Sudanese in Sudan. 52 Authorities in Juba appeared to fear losing control, shutting down social media platforms. 53 Many South Sudanese worry that local clashes could expand dramatically if political infighting continues and the economy flatlines. With a military that has not been paid in months – leaving soldiers to extort money from the public – Juba is hardly equipped to handle spreading unrest.
For more, read the full February 6 briefing with graphics.
Nor is it in a good place to create conditions for the political renewal that the country so desperately needs. In September 2024, the country’s leaders agreed to extend the 2018 peace agreement between the government and opposition groups and postpone by two years what would have been its first democratic elections. It was the right decision, given political divisions and the difficulty of staging credible polls amid widespread instability, but 2026 is not far off, and it will take major political and technical breakthroughs to keep the timetable on track. For elections to happen, South Sudan will need to compete a new constitution, conduct a census and register voters. Overhanging the preparations, moreover, are simmering questions about who might succeed Kiir, who has now ruled South Sudan for close to two decades but is known to be in poor health. Jockeying to be his replacement is in full swing and could set off its own power struggle within the regime.
With South Sudan facing myriad challenges, there are several areas in which AU engagement could be of assistance. First, in order to shore up political stability in Juba, the AU should express its support of existing bilateral efforts by major member states. There is first the Kenya-led initiative to fortify the 2018 peace deal, which for all its imperfections provides the scaffolding for the country’s political order. Kenya launched that effort, dubbed the Tumaini initiative, in May 2024; it aims to forge a deal between the SPLM and holdout armed groups that did not sign the 2018 agreement. While the few opposition figures residing in Nairobi do not have substantial power themselves, the Kenyan-led talks appear to be the only serious forum at the moment for South Sudanese to discuss the way forward, and Kenya appears to be the only regional player active in trying to put together an accord among the Juba elites. The AU should publicly signal its support for the Kenya talks and encourage the government to conclude the process.
The AU could encourage Pretoria and Nairobi to work more closely together.
Further, the AU could urge greater collaboration between Kenya and South Africa, which is the organisation’s own lead member state on South Sudan. Pretoria has long chaired the C5 group of African countries tasked by the AU with supporting South Sudan, and it remains an off-and-on power broker in Juba. South Africa has intervened at various points in the past few years to help mediate among South Sudan’s top elite and seems especially interested in encouraging the reunification of the SPLM, which splintered in 2013. (South Africa’s ruling African National Congress has deep historical ties to the SPLM.) Given the crisis at hand, the AU could encourage Pretoria and Nairobi to work more closely together, and offer to support the initiative with its own diplomacy, including by appointing a new high-level envoy for South Sudan to do this work.
The AU, Kenyan, and South African interlocutors might then join forces to press South Sudan’s elites to act with greater urgency in arriving at a big-tent deal that would try to avert a power struggle at this delicate moment.
Also, while the AU will likely have little influence in easing South Sudan’s economic pangs, it can and should step up its efforts to help end the war in Sudan and encourage donors to support humanitarian aid to spillover countries like South Sudan. The U.S. has said its late January aid freeze includes carveouts for life-saving humanitarian assistance, but it is nevertheless hard to be sanguine about the impact in places like South Sudan, which rely heavily on U.S. aid. As many as nine million South Sudanese are experiencing acute food insecurity, and the U.S. provided $600 million in humanitarian assistance in 2024. Diplomats are concerned that a big chunk of U.S. aid will be withdrawn as the new administration works through its plans for reforming U.S. aid programs.
Thirdly, the AU, together with the UN, could help the country prepare for elections, removing the obstacles that have served as an excuse for politicians not to hold them. It could, for instance, offer technical support to meet benchmarks such as registering voters. The AU should also keep helping the UN with much-needed civic education.
8. Adopting a Position on Climate Security
African states are at the front lines of the climate crisis, grappling with weather shocks that fuel political and socio-economic tensions. The continent contributes just 4 per cent of global greenhouse gas emissions. 59 Yet it is disproportionately affected by droughts, floods and heat waves, which have become increasingly severe, displacing millions and promising to intensify competition for water and grazing land. African countries have long recognised that climate change is a “threat multiplier” that worsens instability in fragile countries. 60 Today, four years after the AU PSC first called for a common African position on climate, peace and security, the AU has developed a draft that outlines a clear set of policy priorities. The PSC should ideally adopt this document by November, when the G20 summit will take place in South Africa and the UN climate conference, or COP30, will convene in Brazil. The AU common position highlights Africa’s need for climate finance while calling on wealthier nations, many of which are significant polluters, to make affordable financing available.
The key to Africa’s response is adaptation to a warming world and the adverse weather accompanying it. The question that remains to be answered is how to pay for early warning systems as well as sturdier bridges and roads, coastal defences against rising oceans and irrigation dams. A recent study estimates that African governments already need to spend up to 9 per cent of state budgets to mitigate the consequences of climate extremes. In 2024, a vast swathe of the Sahel was hit by the worst floods in decades, killing hundreds in at least five countries and leading to massive loss of cropland in Mali and Nigeria. Farther south, the most severe drought in a generation decimated harvests in countries ranging from Zimbabwe and Malawi to Mozambique.
Cuts in U.S. humanitarian aid … will make it harder for African countries to cope with the aftermath of climate disasters.
While Africa should focus on long-term planning, trying to obtain the funds needed to build infrastructure that can withstand extreme weather, its ability to react to present events may also be hampered. Drastic cuts in U.S. humanitarian aid announced by President Donald Trump will likely make it harder for African countries to cope with the aftermath of climate disasters. In Somalia, for example, funding from the U.S. Agency for International Development helped prevent a drought-induced famine in 2022, saving thousands of lives. With major European donors also scaling back assistance and climate financing, there is even more pressure on African governments to invest in disaster response capacity and seek new funding sources to cope when those disasters occur.
The AU PSC called for a climate security envoy as far back as 2018
The AU Commission deserves credit for consistently highlighting the link between extreme weather and insecurity, even as the UN Security Council remains divided on the issue. In recent years, the continent has also made significant strides in raising its profile at forums such as the annual COP meetings. At COP28 in 2023, the host, the United Arab Emirates, released a declaration (endorsed by Crisis Group and 93 other signatories, including nineteen African countries) urging donors to help conflict-affected nations and expedite resilience projects. It rightly emphasised integrating conflict considerations into donor programming, building local resilience through early warning systems and attaining more flexibility so as to better respond to evolving conflict situations. These recommendations align with the draft common African position.
For all the merits of this draft, the AU has been slow in convincing African governments of the benefits of supporting the document. Four years after the AU PSC first called on member states to embrace the framework, the organisation has made scant progress in convincing them to come on board. Some member states still view the proposal with scepticism or indifference, dismissing it as either too ambitious or irrelevant to pressing domestic concerns. AU leaders need to impress on member states that the common position helps Africa speak with one voice at global forums such as COP and the G20. That, in turn, should make it easier to negotiate affordable financing and develop climate resilience projects. One way to proceed would be for the AU PSC, under whose remit the framework falls, given its focus on climate, peace and security, to adopt the common position ahead of the important international meetings taking place in November. African heads of state could then endorse it at their annual summit in early 2026.
In a similar vein, the AU should appoint a climate security envoy with sufficient political clout and technical expertise to coordinate African efforts and bolster Africa’s participation in global climate security discussions. The AU PSC called for a climate security envoy as far back as 2018, and it is unclear why one has not yet been appointed. Funding constraints may inform the apparent lack of political will, but whatever the reason, the stakes are too high not to keep trying.
For more, read the full briefing here.
