Rather than seeking common African positions, prioritising Africa’s development and peace can provide a foundation for meaningful global influence.
The international order is being challenged by tensions between the global north or West and the emerging global south powers, particularly the BRICS+ group. In a divided world, major and middle powers from both sides are courting Africa, as seen in the many summit meetings and billion-dollar investment pledges.
But do these partnerships strengthen Africa’s position on the world stage as the African Union (AU) claims?
Over 12 different Africa summits are now held with external partners – most recently with China and Indonesia. The September China-Africa summit saw a pledge US$50 billion to Africa over the next three years. It follows the United States’ (US) pledge of US$55 billion over three years to shared priorities and the African Union’s (AU) Agenda 2063. Japan has committed US$30 billion, and Russia has proposed several collaborative and consultative arrangements.
Perhaps most important is Africa’s relationship with the European Union (EU). The last EU-African Union Summit in Brussels in 2022 agreed on a joint vision for a renewed partnership and investments of €150 billion.
The AU says such partnerships aim to enhance Africa’s international standing and global leverage. By prioritising these relationships, particularly with emerging powers such as Indonesia, Africa seeks to maximise its impact in international affairs.
According to the AU, the proliferation of partnerships is evidence of Africa’s growing prominence in the global arena and its strategic approach to achieving continental objectives through multilateral cooperation.
In theory, having more partners gives Africa additional options to negotiate and choose from, thereby increasing its bargaining power, decision-making autonomy and flexibility in international relations.
But there is little evidence that these efforts have lessened external interference in Africa. For example, the wave of coups in the Sahel region has led to an alliance between ‘coup governments.’ The alliance is backed by security guarantees from Russia to establish the Confederation of Sahel States, which threatens both the AU and the Economic Community of West African States.
Some argue that Africa has a unique opportunity to help shape a future world order, owing to its demography, critical minerals and importance in diplomatic and geopolitical alliances. It could advocate for more equitable representation within its various partnerships and in key international institutions such as the United Nations (UN) Security Council. The multiplicity of engagements thus enhances Africa’s agency in global affairs.
In pursuit of a global system fit for the future, the AU could deploy its common African positions – for example, the Ezulwini Consensus and Sirte Declaration. These outline Africa’s stance on UN reform, including of the UN Security Council – demanding permanent representation with veto rights, increased non-permanent seats, and AU-led selection of African representatives.
Such documents illustrate Africa’s commitment to multilateralism while aiming to address historical injustices and ensure inclusive representation and meaningful participation in global governance structures.
However, given Africa’s diversity and complexity, common African positions are few and far between. Crafting them is often costly and laborious, and once set, they bring a rigidity to reform. They may also divert attention from Africa’s internal pressing peace and development priorities.
Rather than striving for continent-wide positions and action, an introspective strategy prioritising Africa’s development and peace would more effectively enhance the continent’s geopolitical agency. This should be complemented by a more strategic engagement with key partners.
The continent must focus on strengthening its own institutions, resolving internal conflicts and building economic resilience before committing significant resources to broader international issues where its interests are not at stake.
By addressing internal challenges first, Africa can develop a stronger foundation from which to exercise meaningful influence in global affairs and protect its strategic interests. A more pragmatic and dynamic approach is needed, where the multitude of external engagements complements the pursuit of domestic African peace and development.
Africa should commit to foreign policy support only on matters where its interests are directly at stake. It should pursue common positions on issues that hinder the continent’s ability to achieve peace and development – like meddling by Gulf states.
The Pan-African agenda should prioritise preventing new conflicts and responding timeously to ongoing wars in Sudan, Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Libya and others. Reform of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, and putting the World Trade Organization into operation, directly impact Africa’s development priorities, and need continental action.
Pursuing global tax reform, reducing sovereign borrowing costs, addressing debt relief, pursuing simplified access to private capital and climate financing, and establishing common standards for infrastructure development are also crucial. These targets are realistic and can better meet people’s needs.
As part of a strategic foreign policy aimed at the future, African states should agree on a standardised set of transparency and project execution guidelines that are uniformly applicable to foreign investors and countries operating in Africa. These criteria must encompass public consultations and sustainability benchmarks. The requirements should be clear, simple and publicly available – as all subsequent agreements should be.
The AU should lead the development of a binding legal protocol that spells out these requirements, followed by domestic enactment and implementation. Strict regulatory and enforcement mechanisms should accompany such a protocol, which should govern all foreign investment and sovereign loan agreements in Africa.
Initiatives such as reforming African and international peace and security architectures and implementing the African Continental Free Trade Area and Agenda 2063 should be prioritised. With these clear priorities, Africa can forge specific beneficial partnerships while removing requirements that constrain African agency, ultimately contributing to a more inclusive and stable international order.
This article was first published in the Africa Tomorrow blog of the ISS’ African Futures and Innovation programme.
Jakkie Cilliers, Head, African Futures and Innovation, ISS Pretoria
Mehari Taddele Maru, Adjunct Professor, European University Institute and Johns Hopkins University
