When the dust cleared, the burgundy and white Maule lay broken on the side of the runway, its wings folded like a dead dove fallen from great heights.
The right main wheel lay off to the left side of the airplane, while its nose lay in the dirt and grass just beyond the asphalt — the three-bladed prop wrapped back around the cowling like a curled ribbon on a birthday present.
The airplane had exactly 15 hours on it. It was brand spanking new, having barely flown enough to smash a bug with its vortex generator-studded wings.
The Final Flight
The proud pilot-owner of the new Maule, which was the M-7-235C model, felt he needed guidance with landing on short and narrow fields, particularly at Abbeville Airport (SC81) in South Carolina, which was apparently his home base.
The single runway at Abbeville is 2,250 long at an elevation of 549 MSL and is 40-feet wide, only seven feet wider than the Maule itself. That’s still easily within the capabilities of the airplane, but I respect the owner for recognizing he was outside of his comfort zone and wanting to get some professional guidance.
Unfortunately, his choice of instructor was not as good as his choice of airplane. But before we get into that, let’s review the crash.
On the day of the accident, the pilot-owner and the CFI met in person for the first time, did some ground work, took off, and after some air work, flew about a dozen miles to the northeast to practice landings at Greenwood County Airport (KGRD), where Runway 05 is 3,600-feet-long by 60-feet-wide, before returning to SC81 to take on landings on the narrower, shorter runway.
The owner told authorities that he “arrived too high for the runway” — although it’s worth noting that narrow runways can trick you into thinking you are higher than you are, known as the Runway Width Illusion — and that he planned a go-around.
At this point, according to the pilot-owner, the instructor told him not to go around, took control of the ship, and proceeded to demonstrate a slip to landing which “entered a ground loop to the left after touchdown,” wrecking the airplane.
At least, that’s one version of the story.
Because the NTSB’s final report on the accident goes on to say that “the flight instructor provided a contrary account of the accident sequence.”
The CFI’s version of the story is that the owner was at the controls the entire time, and that he overcontrolled the left rudder “one foot above the ground” during the landing, which happened too quickly for the instructor to take control.
The NTSB’s final report reads: “The pilot flying could not be determined since both pilots claimed that the other was at the controls during the landing.”
As is common with this kind of accident, called a Loss of Control on Ground (LOC-G) by the NTSB, the airplane took the worst of it. In the two years since the accident, Flight Aware shows it hasn’t flown again.
And, while at the time of the crash, neither man thought he was injured, a few days after the crash the CFI started having chest pain, which turned out to be fractured ribs sustained in the accident.
The Pilots
The Maule’s new owner was a 72-year-old male. He held a commercial certificate and a Class 2 medical, but was not an occupational pilot. His total time was 849 hours, with 11 hours in make and model. He had both tailwheel and high performance endorsements.
The instructor was a 74-year-old male. He held a commercial certificate with single-engine land and sea, plus multi land. On the instructor front, he had the full house: CFI, CFII, and MEI. He was listed as an occupational pilot who was flying under BasicMed, which is absolutely legal for instruction, as he is functioning in the role of teacher, not as a pilot for hire. He had 3,025 hours of total time, but zero time in the accident make and model, excluding the accident flight itself.
Oh, we are so going to talk more about that, but first…
Analysis & Discussion
Other than the disagreement about who was flying, the wreck itself is quite pedestrian and, unfortunately, rather common.
LOC-G is by far the most frequently occurring type of flight training accident, making up a whopping 25% of them over the last decade.
As it so happens, I know a thing or two about this kind of accident, having been on point for a study of them for the first National Association of Flight Instructors (NAFI) Summit in 2023 by Luna Community College’s College and Career Readiness Institute run by General Aviation News contributor Lisa F. Bentson. The presentation is available at FAASafety.gov.
As was the case here, LOC-G typically causes substantial damage to airplanes (71% of the time), but rarely injures pilots seriously, discounting the damage to pride.
About a quarter of these wrecks involve tailwheel aircraft, which is interesting, but not all that useful a number, as I don’t think anyone knows the breakdown of training hours in tailwheels vs. trikes.
And, as with this accident, most involve a landing operation, and 67% of them involve two certificated pilots, not an instructor and a student.
That last fact is troubling in general, but particularly in light of the fact that the CFI didn’t have any experience in the airplane that he was providing training in. I don’t want to say it was an accident waiting to happen, but it was certainly a stacked deck.
The Experience Issue
So what about the fact that the instructor was giving instruction in an airplane that he himself didn’t know at all?
Let me be clear: This is perfectly legal and, in some cases, it’s justifiable.
Legal first.
This instructor held single engine land, single engine sea, and multi-engine land certificates. On the instructor side, he held CFI, CFII, and MEI ratings.
The way the regulations work, on the multi side of the house, an instructor is required to have five hours in make and model to offer instruction (14 CFR § 61.195 (f)). But on the single side, that’s not true.
And just like any SEL pilot can fly any SEL airplane (excepting those carve outs that require specific training and endorsements), any SEL instructor can offer training in any SEL airplane with no required time in make and model.
That said, it violates the widely-understood notions of instructor professionalism.
That, and the accident combined, bought the CFI in this case a “709 ride,” meaning the FAA compelled him to essentially re-take his check rides.
Now, I said a moment ago that it is sometimes justifiable to teach in an airplane you don’t know. This comes into play when we are talking about one-of-a-kind or very rare aircraft. In those cases, sometimes you just have to go with someone who has a lot of general experience even though they may be lacking in make and model experience.
But the Maule just celebrated 62 years of FAA type certification. Hardly an orphan airplane, they are currently in production, and are sufficiently common for one aviation magazine to note that “it’s nearly impossible to find a backcountry airport or airstrip that doesn’t have at least one Maule parked on it.”
With that kind of commonality, there’s no need to teach in the airplane without experience. The instructor should have politely declined the gig.
That said, the customer has some culpability here, too. In fact, in the safety recommendation section of his report to the NTSB, the pilot-owner suggested, “Get a CFI with experience in the Maule.”
Indeed. And I think that the pilot-owner should have learned more about the instructor’s experience as part of normal due diligence.
The Takeaways
I see two.
The first is a reminder to use the boring old positive exchange of controls from initial flight training during post-certification training. This is often dropped in post-initial training environments, which could be one reason the data shows us that wrecks with two certificated pilots on a training flight are more common than those with an instructor and a student pilot.
There should never be any doubt about who is flying the airplane, no matter where you are in the training and experience cycle. And maybe there was a positive exchange, although neither of the men mentioned it in their official reports on the accident.
In a letter from the CFI’s attorney to the FAA, the attorney claimed that his client emphasized — on the ground — that the pilot-owner was to be the PIC for the flight, which is irrelevant, as PIC is very different from who “has the flight controls” for any given phase of flight.
Secondly, when hiring a CFI, dig deep into qualifications. Simply holding a flight instructor certificate doesn’t mean that someone is necessarily qualified for the job you need them to do.
As flight instructors get rarer — which will only continue to worsen with the next crest of the pilot shortage right over the horizon — it will take pilots more time, will cost more money, and perhaps involve wait-times to find an instructor who’s experienced with the operations that you need training on.
But more time, and money, or even having to wait for training beats having a 15-hour-old airplane broken to pieces right in front of your eyes before you’ve even made the first payment.
The Numbers
Want to read more? Download the NTSB’s final report here or view the items on docket here.
