Debating Ideas reflects the values and editorial ethos of the African Arguments book series, publishing engaged, often radical, scholarship, original and activist writing from within the African continent and beyond. It offers debates and engagements, contexts and controversies, and reviews and responses flowing from the African Arguments books. It is edited and managed by the International African Institute, hosted at SOAS University of London, the owners of the book series of the same name.
With the return of Donald Trump, existing alignments are undergoing serious scrutiny, as reaction to real and imagined orientations of the new administration in Washington. It is safe to presume that the US-China relationship will assume centre stage; and that Washington’s interactions with the EU and NATO will encounter serious setbacks. Simultaneously, US relations with Moscow might assume a different direction; and ties with Israel could be reinvigorated. These will impact ongoing geopolitical tussles across the globe, including contestations in the Far East, Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Doubts are already resurfacing about the conduct and course of the US involvements in Ukraine, and the Israel-Palestine conflict.
African affairs were not top of the agendas of consecutive governments in Washington. Engagements with the continent appear predominantly reactions to the growing involvement of third parties including China, Russia and the Gulf states. Acute security and geostrategic considerations inform the engagement matrix. Intermittent attempts often prioritized one-size-fits-all US-Africa summits; or targeted interactions with specific actors deemed vital to America’s strategic military and/or political interests. Pledges to recast the entire interaction on joint economic development ventures have failed to acquire necessary traction. Overall, the incoming administration is not expected to introduce new approaches in matters pertaining to Africa.
African affairs are increasingly assuming centre stage, primarily as a result of the desire by regional and global powers to sway strategic favours in the continent. One has to factor in the overall dynamics involving the Sahel, Great Lakes region, the Nile basin and the Red Sea-Indian Ocean littoral. Emerging alignments, both local and international, reflect the acute desire to ascertain control over the associated geostrategic assets the continent holds in store. The BRICS + now have three major African nations – South Africa, Egypt and Ethiopia – as full members, and recently enlisted Nigeria, Algeria and Uganda as partners. This is not an easy feat in light of the China-Russia-India collaboration, and the Saudi Arabia-UAE-Iran axis in the making. Incessant calls to overhaul the prevailing international order, controlled by the West, and ensuing efforts at de-dollarization, are bound to create seismic shockwaves across the geopolitical divide.
The last couple of years have witnessed fewer interactions between the US and Africa. President Obama’s tenure failed to live up to expectations; the application of AGOA and the Libya fiasco defined the extreme points in the overall legacy. Subsequent administrations proved inconsequential, handling handpicked African dossiers from afar primarily as a reaction to the involvement of third parties. Military operations in the Sahel have visibly encountered deadlock and attempts at relocating the overall operational theatre to Kenya appear premature. Courting President Ruto as the new foster child of American security ventures in Eastern and Central Africa, and the Sahel region, has yet to register the desired end goal. Efforts at enlisting Somalia under this framework, with security and financial packages in place, await the test of time. The vital role Egypt traditionally assumes in the affairs of the Middle East as well as Northeast Africa is increasingly assuming defensive postures.
Outstanding geostrategic alignments in Northeast Africa in general and the Horn in particular are bound to undergo altercations with the second Trump presidency. Positive anticipations might abound in Cairo, hopeful of continuing the legacy of closer affinity during the first term. President Sisi is expected to re-enlist Washington’s endorsement on matters pertaining to the Nile controversy and Red Sea dynamics. Kenya will strive to maintain Washington’s favour as the new epicentre of regional peace and security matters. Somalia has little option other than ingratiating Washington in its drive for security sector reform. All hinges on the foreign policy orientation of the incoming administration.
Egypt’s recent vitality in the Israel-Palestine crisis as well as the overall geopolitical tussle in the Middle East/Gulf have proven below par, diminishing its overall rating as a key player in the larger region. Increasingly crowded out of the geopolitical space across the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, Cairo’s attention has been diverted southwards towards the greater Horn. Here, its engagements proved more confrontational and divisive than constructive, in the process making it less viable an alternative to what Washington might seek in the immediate future.
Kenya’s political and economic posture leaves much to be desired for it to assume the role of anchor state in the region. President Ruto has yet to scale the internal challenges to pursue the ‘peace diplomacy’ agenda. Getting the opposition leader, Raila Odinga, out of the picture on the home front, presumably as the next chairperson of the AU, is the immediate litmus test for the success of his political ambitions.
Somalia’s regional interplays, propelled by calculated repositioning against Ethiopia’s gamble to acquire sovereign access to the sea through the breakaway state of Somaliland, have generated more complications. Out of desperation, Mogadishu has invited irreconcilable regional actors like Egypt and Turkey to its shores; and has entered into a delicate trilateral alignment with Egypt and Eritrea. Estrangements between the Federal Government of President Hassen Shiek Mohammud and the Federal Member States (FMS) has never been tense. As a result, the impending transition from African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) to Africa Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), in light of Ethiopia’s place therein, remains the real manifestation in the overall geostrategic tussle in the peace and security architecture of Somalia and the immediate region.
The US-Africa Command Base at Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti remains a key strategic installation to monitor developments across the Red Sea divide, especially in the Horn of Africa. This potentially diminishes the prospect for another military base in Kenya. Likewise, the Trump administration is expected to pursue a one-Somalia policy, in the process delaying Somaliland’s bid for de jure independence in the immediate future. But there remains a real chance of US constructive engagement with Eritrea primarily to ward off Russia and China from securing strategic posts in the northwestern shores of the Red Sea. In which case Ethiopia risks the real threat of being the sore loser out of the whole dynamic.
The Ethiopian premier was among the first world leaders to congratulate Trump on his victory. This does not change the fact that objective realities are not conducive to cordial relationships between the two countries. Experiences during the first Trump tenure proved difficult, and additional flashpoints emerged afterwards. A significant factor in this regard is the drastic change in allegiances of the Ethiopian diaspora in the US. Local uncertainties as well as the wavering foreign policy and international relations posture of the regime in Addis Ababa have contributed to the impasse. There exists visible failure on the part of Ethiopia to appraise the US and the West in general, while efforts to ingratiate the likes of China and Russia remain non-committal and below par.
The US-Ethiopia rapport basically stems from the latter’s actual and imagined place as key player in the peace and security architecture of the immediate region. Curbing terrorism and extremism in Somalia, bringing about comprehensive political settlement in South Sudan, keeping Eritrea at bay, and playing a stabilizing role in Sudan were among the expectations. Ethiopia’s traditional leadership roles within IGAD and the AU, as well as its historic presence in global multilateral forums including the UN and the Non-Aligned movement, have made it a force to be reckoned with. Consultations and even decisions on the affairs of the Horn necessitated Ethiopia’s active involvement, which has not recently been the case. Given this reality, it would not be surprising to witness the continuation of the same non-committal interaction with the upcoming US administration.
Critical point of departures in the relationship matrix are how Washington handles the GERD/Nile utilization issue, the Somaliland dossier, the composition and mandate of AUSSOM, Eritrea, and the Sudan war. Ethiopia’s wobbly regional posture in regard to these flashpoints might determine the course of the Addis-Washington interaction in the months and years to come. There remains a stark possibility of the relationship matrix being an extension of US policy orientations towards much bigger regional and global actors operating in the greater Horn notably the Gulf States, China and Russia. Nonetheless, the unpredictable nature of the two administrations, and their far-right, populist, and neo-national dispositions might inform future engagements.
Dr. Belete Belachew Yihun is a foreign policy and international relations analyst specializing on the Horn of Africa and Middle East/Gulf. He currently resides in the U.S.
