In March 2024, then-President Joe Biden announced the U.S. would create a new pathway for international aid into war-torn Gaza: a floating pier system operated by the Army and Navy known as Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore, or JLOTS. Later that month, construction was underway on the pier; but it was unceremoniously shut down for good in July, having spent only 20 days active amid equipment failures and insurmountable sea conditions.
Now, a new report from the Defense Department’s independent watchdog reveals just how ill-prepared the military services were to build the floating pier to Gaza. It found, among other things, mission planners failed to identify environmental factors, such as beach conditions and sea states, likely to affect the success of JLOTS; Army and Navy equipment was not interoperable and caused damage when combined; and cuts to training and resources further challenged the operation’s success.
The DOD Office of Inspector General report, dated Friday, recommends the creation of a new working group focused on JLOTS, a report to the defense secretary and the Joint Staff identifying gaps in its capabilities and better communication between the services, particularly through U.S. Transportation Command, which coordinated the mission.
The JLOTS pier, built under the mission name Operation Neptune Solace, was not a complete failure. During its operational period, it delivered some 19.4 million pounds of food aid to Gaza, enough to feed half a million Palestinian civilians for a month. But the IG found that its usefulness was badly curtailed by planning and resourcing failures, some of which had been observed for years prior to the mission.
While DOD had run 11 JLOTS exercises in the decade prior to the Gaza operation, the 84-page report found, neither the Army nor the Navy JLOTS packages met service standards for mission readiness, including equipment mission-capable rates. The actual readiness rates and unit manning shortages are redacted in the report, but it does note that the lack of resourcing had clear consequences.
“According to [U.S. Army 7th Transportation Brigade (Expeditionary)] officials, manning shortages delayed the deployment of some Army watercraft for Operation Neptune Solace,” investigators wrote.
Officials with Navy Beach Group One, investigators added, said the unit “had to pull together every person they could to sufficiently staff vessels in accordance with Navy requirements.”
Between 2018 and 2023, the Army and Navy had completed major divestments of equipment the JLOTS system required, it found, including roughly half the Army’s watercraft, or 64 out of 134, and one of the Navy’s two JLOTS-capable units, Amphibious Construction Battalion 2. Officials in units involved with the deployment to Gaza “expressed concern at the Services’ divestment of JLOTS capabilities and stated their belief that the DoD’s current JLOTS capabilities were not sufficient to meet projected needs,” the report found.
And the JLOTS training that had occurred at the DOD level had not trouble-shot a major problem with the Gaza deployment: the fact that the Army and Navy equipment was not meant to be used together. Both Army and Navy officials, the report said, had cited issues with the other service’s pier gear. The Improved Navy Lighterage System, or INLS, and the Army’s roll-on, roll-off discharge facility — both versions of floating docks — sat at different heights in the water. The Navy gear warped Army boat ramps, while the Army boats punched “a bunch of holes” into Navy docks, officials told investigators.
An image published in the report shows an Army vessel with gouges in the base and the words “total loss” spray-painted on the side.
While the Army’s damage assessment is redacted, the Navy reported damage to 27 boats and INLS equipment totaling about $31 million. U.S. Central Command reported that 62 U.S. personnel were also injured during Neptune Solace, the IG reported, although the manner of the injuries and how they took place was not provided.
One service member died as a result of injuries sustained during non-combat duties on the mission. Army Sgt. Quandarius Stanley died in November after being critically injured in May when high winds and heavy seas damaged the pier, causing four Army vessels to become beached, The Associated Press reported at the time.
Army and Navy communication systems weren’t interoperable either, the report found — a problem highlighted in earlier JLOTS exercises. As a result, the services were sometimes left without secure communications, according to the IG.
On top of insufficient training and equipping, planning also fell short, the IG found. Despite clear sea state limits established for JLOTS, planners in the services and Geographic Combatant Commands “did not fully identify or consider mission-specific requirements, such as beach conditions, average sea states, and other factors likely to affect the ability to successfully conduct a JLOTS operation,” and lacked information specific to the Gaza region.
The report recommended the Army and the Navy individually review their JLOTS capabilities and determine what changes need to be made to meet mission requirements, which service leaders agreed with. It also called on U.S. Transportation Command to develop JLOTS mission-essential task lists and establish other measures to ensure JLOTS missions had the resources they needed.
While TRANSCOM partially concurred, the IG stated its responses did not address how the command planned to better fulfill its coordinating responsibilities for JLOTS. It requested TRANSCOM submit a full report detailing such a plan within 30 days.
