French President Emmanuel Macron said on May 13, 2025, that he is open to discussions about deploying French nuclear weapons to European countries that request them.
The remarks, made during an interview with TF1, mark his clearest signal yet that France’s nuclear deterrent could extend the scope of its nuclear umbrella.
“Since General de Gaulle, there has always been a European dimension in how we define our vital interests,” Macron said. “I will lay out the framework officially in the coming weeks and months, but we have already initiated discussions, within the limits I’ve mentioned.”
De Gaulle’s legacy: The birth of France’s independent nuclear force
Upon returning to power in 1958, President Charles de Gaulle prioritized the development of an independent French nuclear deterrent, initially known as the Force de Frappe. Motivated by a desire for strategic autonomy during the Cold War, de Gaulle rejected reliance on US-controlled NATO nuclear planning and insisted that France must be able to defend itself independently.
In 1964, this vision materialized with the creation of the Forces Aériennes Stratégiques (FAS), the airborne component of France’s nuclear triad. Equipped initially with Mirage IV bombers carrying gravity bombs, the FAS was designed to ensure a credible second-strike capability under full French command.
De Gaulle emphasized national sovereignty, survivability, and the concept of “dissuasion du faible au fort” (deterrence of the strong by the weak). To this day, France’s nuclear doctrine is based on “strict sufficiency”, meaning its arsenal is designed to be just large enough to deter any potential adversary through the threat of unacceptable damage.
Unlike the United States or Russia, which maintain large, multi-layered nuclear forces, France prioritizes a smaller but highly survivable deterrent.
Among those limits is the question of financing. France’s nuclear program currently represents 13.45% of its defense budget, and Macron made clear that any deployment of Rafale fighters abroad, or part of the constant modernization of the airborne deterrent, would need to be funded by the host nations.
As part of the Rafale’s upcoming F5 standard, France is developing the ASN4G, a hypersonic, nuclear-capable ramjet missile that is expected to replace the ASMPA-R as the air-launched component of its nuclear deterrent by 2035.
“This will not come at the expense of what we need for ourselves,” Macron also said, adding that “the final decision [to conduct a nuclear strike] will always rest with the President of the [French] Republic, head of the Armed Forces.”
This is the first time a French president has openly raised the possibility of stationing French nuclear weapons outside France in peacetime, a potential break from France’s traditionally sovereign and tightly held nuclear doctrine.
France’s nuclear force: Independent but limited
France, the EU’s only nuclear power, maintains an independent arsenal of roughly 290 warheads. These are delivered via two platforms: submarine-launched ballistic missiles aboard Le Triomphant-class SSBNs and ASMPA-R cruise missiles carried by Dassault Rafale B fighters of the Air and Space Force’s Strategic Air Forces (FAS).
“Posting a few French nuclear jet fighters in Germany should not be difficult and would send a strong message [to Russia],” a French official in The Telegraph, February 2025
Unlike the US-led NATO nuclear sharing agreement, under which countries like Germany and Italy host American B61 gravity bombs, France’s arsenal is fully sovereign, including its delivery platforms.
“The independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France have a deterrent role of their own and contribute significantly to the overall security of the Alliance,” NATO allies explained in their last Strategic Concept adopted in Madrid in June 2022. “Separate centres of decision-making contribute to deterrence by complicating the calculations of potential adversaries.”
But that sovereignty also comes with limits. France’s nuclear system also presents technical challenges. The ASMPA-R is tailored to the Rafale, making it incompatible with allied fleets such as the F-35. This limits any future deployments to French-operated platforms, meaning France would need to station its own aircraft and personnel abroad rather than transfer weapons or delivery capabilities.
France’s airborne deterrent is relatively small, with only two Rafale squadrons based at Saint-Dizier currently nuclear-certified. In March 2025, France unveiled plans to reactivate Luxeuil Air Base as a component of France’s nuclear deterrence, with new infrastructure projects to accommodate two additional Rafale squadrons.
Nuclear deterrence conversation amid renewed Franco-Polish alliance
Macron’s remarks came the same day the FAS carried out Operation Poker, a full-spectrum simulated nuclear strike conducted quarterly. The exercise involves long-range missions with aerial refueling, low-level penetration through contested airspace, and a simulated ASMPA launch over the DGA test range.
Tonight 🇫🇷French strategic forces☢️ are gonna demonstrate once again their skills.
2nd edition of the year of Poker strategic exercise just started.
And as @GaetanPowis noticed, one of the tankers callsign is POKER250. Would this be the 250th edition ? (poke @EscadronsChasse pic.twitter.com/5DAwi6KPs2
— Etienne Marcuz (@Etienne_Marcuz) May 13, 2025
Macron’s comments also followed the signing of a Franco-Polish Treaty of Friendship and Enhanced Cooperation in Nancy on May 9, 2025. The agreement commits both countries to mutual assistance in the event of armed aggression, referencing NATO’s Article 5 and the EU’s collective defense clause. While it does not explicitly extend France’s nuclear umbrella, the text calls for a “strategic dialogue” and deeper cooperation in defense and security matters, including areas related to deterrence, suggesting potential alignment with Macron’s evolving posture.
Both Polish President Andrzej Duda and Prime Minister Donald Tusk have expressed openness to French President Emmanuel Macron’s proposal to extend France’s nuclear deterrent to other European Union nations. While their political views often diverge, both leaders appear aligned on the need to bolster Europe’s security posture amid growing regional threats, a rare point of consensus that could lend political weight to potential Franco-Polish nuclear cooperation.
