Radar data revealed that the pilot departed North Perry Airport (KHWO) in Hollywood, Florida, about 1225 and completed two passes in the Piper Pawnee over the airport before proceeding east-northeast about 1229.
After 1229, through the end of the flight, the airplane’s groundspeed averaged about 55 knots, with a minimum speed about 48 knots and a maximum speed about 62 knots.
The airplane reached a maximum altitude of about 800 feet about 1230 before descending to 700 feet about a minute later. Over the remainder of the flight, the airplane’s altitude varied between 400 and 600 feet.
About 1233, the airplane entered a descent that continued until the end of the flight when the airplane hit terrain.
The pilot died in the crash.
Communications between the pilot and the KHWO tower controller revealed that about 1231, the controller stated, “Banner 430AB, everything okay? You are descending rapidly.”
The pilot replied, “I’m trying to uh…keep climbing.”
Less than two minutes later, about 1233, the controller stated, “Banner zero alpha bravo, you okay sir? I’m showing you at 600 feet now.”
The pilot replied, “I’m good now, zero alpha bravo… starting to climb.”
The controller then issued a frequency change to the tower controller at Fort Lauderdale/Hollywood International Airport (KFLL).
The pilot established communications with the KFLL tower controller and did not mention any concerns nor did he declare an emergency.
At 1234, he transmitted on the KFLL frequency, “I might have to drop this banner. I’m not climbing. Zero alpha bravo.”
The controller asked if the pilot would like to return to KHWO and the pilot replied, “I’m at 400 [feet]. I gotta drop this banner over a lake… I’m going to be over these oil tanks with like a lake next to it.”
There were no further communications from the pilot.
According to the banner-towing operator’s director of ground operations, who supervised the flight from the banner pickup point and monitored communications with a handheld radio, the pilot departed around 1225 from Runway 28R. He reported that the pilot picked up the banner at 1229, after a first pass for hook deployment and verification.
The pilot then performed a right climbing turn (per airport procedure), and continued on the downwind leg of the traffic pattern at an altitude of about 600 feet mean sea level heading eastbound and communicating with the KHWO tower controller.
The ground operations director stated that everything appeared to be normal, and that he was watching the airplane when he heard the tower controller ask the pilot if he was “ok,” because the airplane was not climbing.
The ground operations director tried to contact the pilot via radio when he saw that the airplane was not climbing but did not receive a response from the pilot.
He told investigators that the airplane had a high nose-up pitch attitude that was “more than needed” and, in his opinion, was preventing the airplane from climbing. He stated that he did not hear any engine roughness during the flight.
News video depicted the final seconds of the flight and showed the airplane in level flight at low altitude, near rooftop height, in a nose-high pitch attitude. The moment the banner was released, the airplane rolled and yawed right, before the wings leveled and it descended vertically in a nose-up attitude. The airplane then rolled left and entered a steep, nose-down, left spiraling descent out of the camera’s view.
Low resolution surveillance video captured the banner release, the right and left rolls, and then the spiraled, vertical, nose-down collision with the street, where the airplane came to rest and subsequently caught fire.
Company records revealed that the commercial pilot was hired five weeks before the accident. In an interview, the company’s chief pilot said the new-hire training included 40 to 80 hours of classroom, ground, and flight training. The pilot’s training records revealed that he had completed several written and practical examinations. He had a total of 324 total hours of flight experience, including 15 hours in the accident airplane make and model.
The airplane was examined at the accident site and all major components were accounted for at the scene. The entire airplane was consumed by fire.
After the accident, a former employee of the banner-towing operation submitted a written statement describing his experience flying the accident airplane. He reported 180 total hours of flight experience in the Piper PA-25, of which 34 hours was in the accident airplane. He stated that he was taught to perform banner-tow operations at 55 mph indicated airspeed (IAS), but that the airplane exhibited stall characteristics at 70 mph IAS.
In his statement, the pilot offered a brief tutorial based on his understanding of stall characteristics of the PA-25 with a banner in tow.
“The stalling characteristics of the PA-25 are significantly different when a banner is attached to the plane. The banner is dragging the tail down and adding directional stability, keeping the airplane from spinning. The weight of the banner is also adding downward pressure on the tail, keeping the nose from dropping.
“The airplane will continue in a nose up attitude, but it will be descending. The pilot will experience the ‘region of reverse command,’ where the maximum thrust is applied, and the aircraft is pitched up, but not climbing.
“The nose must be lowered to get the airplane to climb. This applies regardless of the stall speed.
“However, if the pilot is not aware of a higher stall speed, the pilot may be looking at the airspeed indicator and seeing a speed much higher than the published stall speed and not understand why the aircraft isn’t climbing. This is what happened to me when I was towing for the first time in N337AB. The airplane maybe stalling, but because of the attached banner, it does not exhibit the normal series of stall characteristics.”
The former employee said when he reported the experience, he was told to “write it up,” which he did. However, a review of maintenance records revealed no evidence of airspeed discrepancies, no corrective actions, nor pitot/static systems checks in the 10 months and about 125 aircraft hours between his experience and the date of the accident.
According to the operator’s training manual, target airspeeds are given (e.g. 95 mph for the pick-up, 70 mph after the push over, etc), “however, the accuracy of airspeed indications in Pawnee aircraft differ from airplane to airplane.”
“Pilots should become familiar with the airspeed indications and flight characteristics of each individual airplane,” the manual continued. “When flying a particular Pawnee for the first time, fly toward the west training area at a safe altitude to determine stall speed and handling characteristics in the configuration (i.e. flaps and windows) you will be using for picking and towing.”
“If you experience difficulty in climbing after picking a banner, or are unable to climb at all, consider the following: First, step on the ball and coordinate the airplane. Even a slightly cross controlled condition will inhibit climb performance. Next, adjust your airspeed. You may be trying to climb at too slow a speed and in the incipient stage of a stall. Lower the nose slightly to gain 5 to 10 mph, which may improve climb performance. Advise Tower that you want to return to the banner box and also advise company.
“As you proceed back toward the banner box you may encounter lift from thermals which will produce a slight improvement in climb performance. If you are still unable to climb, plan on dropping the banner in the banner field. If you manage to climb to 1,300 feet over the banner box make your decision whether it is safe to continue to the display area. If not, advise company and follow ground crew instructions to drop in the banner field. Try to avoid dropping the banner off airport, but if you are unable to maintain altitude find a safe area to drop the banner, advise company ground, then comply with the Lost Banner En Route Procedure.”
Despite the airplane’s apparent lack of climb performance and its failure to meet target altitudes prescribed in the training manual, the pilot continued a generally eastbound heading toward the coastline and his assigned route, rather than returning to KHWO.
During the low-altitude flight, and before reaching the location where the pilot ultimately dropped the banner, the airplane overflew a public park and the athletic fields of two different schools. It is unknown if the fields were occupied or how their availability or occupancy may have affected the pilot’s decision making.
Probable Cause: The pilot’s exceedance of the airplane’s critical angle of attack, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall and loss of aircraft control.
NTSB Identification: 174547
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This May 2023 accident report is provided by the National Transportation Safety Board. Published as an educational tool, it is intended to help pilots learn from the misfortunes of others.
