“Space control” is a legacy term of art from United States military doctrine for space operations. It refers to the mission of ensuring friendly access to outer space. However, there is another form of space control for spacefaring national security organizations, though it isn’t usually discussed in those terms. “The other space control” refers to decisions about who controls what within the U.S. national security space enterprise. Following the establishment of the U.S. Air Force in 1947, the Joint Chiefs of Staff brokered agreements for the division of aircraft among the military services, colloquially referred to as the Key West Agreement. Since the establishment of the U.S. Space Force and U.S. Space Command in 2019, we’ve seen similar deliberations about the roles and responsibilities for various aspects of the national security space enterprise. When the next Trump administration turns its attention to space policy, here are some of the “other space control” matters they are likely to encounter.
First, as the U.S. Space Force and U.S. Space Command each mark their fifth anniversary, they continue to refine the arrangements for who does what between the service and the combatant command. Key West-type arrangements were previously brokered between them through prior rounds of Antares Talks, named after the type of binary star system that appears to shine as one star to observers on Earth. The next Department of Defense (DoD) and Joint Force leaders will inherit an operational space enterprise built around the arrangements brokered at those talks. However, those initial decisions may not be the last word. The most significant outcome of the Antares Talks was agreement about which Space Force capabilities will work for U.S. Space Command (an “astrographic” combatant command) and be managed and employed globally, and which Space Force capabilities will answer directly to the commanders of regionally-defined geographic combatant commands (such as U.S. Indo-Pacific Command or U.S. European Command). Consistent with the Antares agreements, several Space Force Component Commands have already been established within the regional combatant commands. Events that unfold during the next administration will test whether the Antares Talks got the balance right.
Second, space-tinged echoes of the original Key West talks continue to reverberate about the distribution of space capabilities among the military services. Not every military space capability has been transferred to the Space Force. Some space systems remain in the land and sea services where they were originally fielded. The Department of the Army and Department of the Navy each have a vision for the space capabilities remaining in their services, and for the soldiers, sailors, and marines who operate them. Some Space Force advocates have voiced strong objection to the “Army’s Space Force,” alleging overreach in the other services’ vision for their space capabilities. Service and defense leaders in the next administration are likely to encounter these debates during service-level force design and budget processes, especially as the Space Force tests the limits of the Chief of Space Operations’ relatively recent designation as Force Design Architect for Space Systems of the Armed Forces.
Third, responsibility between military commands and intelligence organizations for new satellites doing missions formerly done by military aircraft will continue to be an area of focus. National Reconnaissance Office director Chris Scolese and Department of the Air Force space acquisition executive Frank Calvelli have spoken publicly about new satellites that will provide services like Ground Moving Target Indicator support. Historically, this mission was performed by the Air Force’s JSTARS aircraft. As JSTARS nears the end of its service life, DoD is investing in satellites rather than new aircraft for this mission and possibly others. As overhead reconnaissance systems, these new satellites will resemble capabilities historically controlled by the intelligence community. This question of who controls these new satellites has been studied in depth by military and intelligence stakeholders, and has received significant interest from appropriators in Congress. As with the distribution of military space assets among global and regional commands, operational experience in the years to come will provide insight on whether the initial agreements for military and intelligence responsibilities for new overhead systems got the balance right.
Finally, the possibility of establishing a Space National Guard is sure to be discussed in 2025. Congress recently enacted the Space Force Personnel Management Act, which provides legal authority for a novel and agile personnel system for the Space Force. Under this new authority, enacted with broad bipartisan support, guardians will be able to transition between full-time and part-time duty much more easily than in the other services’ stovepiped Active-Guard-Reserve systems. In the Space Force’s single component, citizen guardians will always perform space missions in federal status. The legal status of military personnel performing space missions matters since space operations are, as a matter of international law, always under the responsibility of the U.S. This is also why commercial space activities are regulated at the federal level, not by the states. Although the Space Force’s single component appears fully sufficient to harness the talent of citizen guardians at units performing an inherently federal mission, governors and advocates for National Guard interests continue to advocate for a Space National Guard. And since President-elect Trump has voiced support for a Space National Guard, it is sure to be on the agenda for discussions about the national security space enterprise during the next administration.
Finding the right balance and structure for national security organizations is always a journey, not a destination. Advances in technology, changes in the threat environment and the hard realities of the budget process force periodic reassessment of force design decisions. Although these realities are not unique to space, the recency of major space enterprise reforms and the growing significance of space to national security and our way of life ensure that “the other space control” will be a prominent aspect of defense and intelligence decision-making for many years to come.
Todd Pennington is the Senior Research Fellow for Space Strategy and Policy at National Defense University’s Institute of National Strategic Studies. He is a retired U.S. Air Force colonel who previously served as a legal advisor for DoD space programs with OSD, U.S. Space Command, and the U.S. Space Force. Pennington is an affiliate fellow with the Georgetown Law Center on National Security, and an adjunct professor of law at Georgetown. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of National Defense University, the Department of Defense or the U.S. government.
