The ceasefire between Israel and Hamas negotiated in mid-January seems to have been written on tissue. It frayed midway through the first of three phases, when Israel declined to negotiate for the second phase. Since then, it was only a countdown until the first hours of Tuesday morning, when the Israel Defense Forces executed a swift and punishing series of airstrikes throughout Gaza.
By Thursday, the IDF’s ground operation got underway with a three-part pincer move, operating in the north of Gaza, in the Strip’s midriff around the Netzarim corridor (from which it had redeployed as part of the deal), and in Rafah in southern Gaza.
At least 400 Gazans were killed on the first day of strikes, in what was one of the deadliest single-day tolls of the war, the Associated Press reported. The toll climbed to as many as 700 by Friday, according to Palestinian health officials. Social media is awash in photos of dead babies. The IDF says it is routing out terror infrastructure and picking off specific Hamas military and political leaders; Palestinians say they are taking down anyone in the vicinity. Hamas and the Houthis have revived rocket fire at Israel.
Where is all this leading? Ironically, it was much easier to predict where things would go two months ago, when the ceasefire deal was agreed, than it is now.
From the moment the details of the agreement became known, analysts gave the deal a poor prognosis.
The first phase involved the release of Israeli hostages and Palestinian prisoners, while the two sides suspended the fighting and Israel withdrew from heavily populated areas and from the Netzarim corridor. The second phase was to include a sustainable ceasefire and full withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza, and further hostage and prisoner release. The third phase would have ended the war and seen the release of the remains of Israeli captives and Palestinians.
But there were two signs that the deal would never reach beyond its first phase.
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The first was that leaders of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s most important coalition partners, the Religious Zionist and Jewish Power parties, made clear that they would bolt the coalition if the fighting stopped—they want to capture and resettle Gaza. When the deal was finally signed, Itamar Ben Gvir, who runs Jewish Power, resigned from Netanyahu’s government, weakening his coalition. Betzalel Smotrich, who runs the Religious Zionist party, remained in government but insisted that Israel must restart the war or he too would leave—which would mean scrapping either the deal or the government.
The second was Israel’s history of decision-making, particularly when it comes to Palestinians: Phased deals don’t usually work. Case in point is the phased, conditional Oslo peace process during the 1990s that Palestinians saw as a path to an eventual Palestinian state and a permanent end to the conflict, neither of which materialized.
Did Hamas want to complete the current ceasefire deal more than Israel? Most likely yes. Gaza is in ruins, nearly 50,000 people have been killed in the war, and polls show that Palestinian hostility toward Hamas has risen. The group holds two main cards for credibility among Palestinians: forcing Israel to release Palestinian prisoners, and being the only Palestinian faction able to end the war. Beyond that, Hamas’ only recourse to staying in power is brute force.
The first phase of the ceasefire went through. But then Israel declined to open negotiations for the second phase, after Trump took office and began talking about expelling 2 million Palestinians in Gaza. Netanyahu became emboldened to resist the second phase; Trump’s Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff began negotiating that phase seemingly from scratch, introducing a new ceasefire plan different from the one both sides agreed to in January.
Now Netanyahu is facing an avalanche of domestic political crises. There is a budget deadline this month that could sink his government; mass street protests have resumed, with tens of thousands calling for a new ceasefire and criticizing Netanyahu for failing to get the remaining hostages home.
Israelis on some level have known more conflict was coming. A February poll by the Institute for National Security Studies found just 40% thought the deal would reach the second phase; more thought the chances were low (46%).
Yet no one knows what happens next. How long will this resurgent war go on? Israel hasn’t been able to eliminate Hamas nor secure the release of most hostages through military pressure throughout the war—why would it be able to do so now? Do exhausted Israeli reservists have the morale for a forever war, and does a forever war lead to a complete military re-occupation of Gaza, alongside the continued expansion of settlements and de facto annexation in the West Bank? If the Israeli government has answers, it’s not saying.
For its part, will Hamas accept a U.S.-backed “bridge plan” to restore the ceasefire and extend it into April, to allow time for continued negotiations? Or will Israeli demands to simply release all hostages and oust Hamas under heavy military pressure work this time around?
There is a better path: ending the occupation through Palestinian self-determination and statehood, possibly anchored in regional normalization deals between Israel and Arab states. That would guarantee Israel’s security and contribute greatly to a more peaceful Middle East.
But those with the power to make peace a reality, apparently prefer to make war.
